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ABSTRACT 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the finance issues currently 
facing diverse SMEs by presenting a new analysis of the SME Finance 
Monitor. While prior studies have contributed substantial evidence 
regarding the effects of either gender or ethnicity on finance outcomes, 
these analyses have typically focused on either women-owned or ethnic 
minority owned enterprises. This study considers the experiences and 
outcomes of both women-owned and ethnic minority-owned enterprises, 
including the interaction effects of ethnicity and gender. Central to this 
analysis is the development of a new typology of borrowers that 
categorises SMEs across six groups: existing borrowers; new/renewed 
borrowers; declined borrowers; partial borrowers; potential borrowers; and 
indifferent non-borrowers. Using this typology as the analytical lens enables 
a more granular view of the SME Finance Monitor dataset, and reveals 
both a broader set of potential borrowers and a wider set of antecedents of 
debt-avoidance than have previously been identified. As prior studies have 
indicated, gender effects that were notable and significant in the initial 
phases of the analysis were mainly dissipated when other factors, such as 
legal form and firm age, were considered. Analyses of ethnicity, however, 
suggest a different experience. While structural factors such as sector, firm 
size, the presence of a business plan, firm age, and legal form all impact on 
finance outcomes, after controlling for these structural factors the relative 
likelihood of borrowing success remains lower among Black and Minority 
Ethnic (BME) business owners as compared their White British and Irish 
(WBI) counterparts.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Attempts to increase the participation rates of under-represented groups in 
enterprise and to increase the growth rates and ambitions of their 
entrepreneurial ventures have to date resulted in only modest changes 
(Alexander et al., 2009; Marlow et al, 2008; Ram and Jones, 2008; Bates, 
2011). The Enterprise Research Centre work pacNDJH RQ µ'LYHUVLW\ DQG
60(VLQWKH(PHUJLQJ(FRQRP\¶VHHNVWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHUHDVRQVIRUWKLV
exploring the drivers and barriers to business development and growth 
among diverse social groups with a focus on the inter-relationship between 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶ HQWrepreneurial decision making and their household context. 
Understanding relative access to finance (Ram et al, 2002; Fraser, 2009) 
and access to markets (Jones et al., 2000; Ram and Smallbone, 2003) 
form core components of this work.  
The first strand of this work package entails secondary analysis of existing 
datasets to better understand the drivers and barriers of entrepreneurial 
growth in under-represented groups. This paper, based on a new analysis 
of the SME Finance Monitor, is the first in a series of papers reporting 
insights from secondary data analysis. Future papers will report insights 
from the British Household Panel Survey and Understanding Society 
survey, focusing on how household resource conditions shape attitudes 
towards business start-up and growth in different social groups. 
2. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF DIVERSE 
ENTERPRISES 
While it is recognised that diversity takes many forms, this ERC Work 
Package focuses on two main groups of diverse enterprises: ethnic 
minority and women owned businesses. Both groups have been the 
subject of considerable, albeit separate, research efforts in recent years in 
the UK and internationally. Although the context of disadvantage for ethnic 
minorities and women is distinctive and different experiences of business 
ownership are evident within both groups - indeed, each group is itself 
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highly heterogeneous - research evidence demonstrates that at an 
aggregate level both groups share three common characteristics (Carter et 
al., 2013). These characteristics, sometimes referred to as the 3Ms, relate 
to concerns surrounding their relative access to and usage of finance 
(money); the effects of structural disadvantage arising from businesses 
located in intensely competitive industry sectors including small-scale 
retailing, catering and services (markets); and the frequently noted 
mismatch between well-educated individuals and their self-employment 
occupation, coupled with a focus on the small scale, under-performing 
nature of their business operations and the management challenges faced 
in diversifying business activities into higher paying sectors (management).  
Ethnic minority-owned businesses (EMBs) are a complex, rapidly evolving 
group of enterprises that include both long-standing communities, notably 
South Asians and African-Caribbeans and comparatively new arrivals from 
Eastern Europe and Africa. Overall, EMBs account for about 8% of small 
businesses in the UK, though a substantially higher proportion of 
businesses within the main urban areas of London, Birmingham, 
Manchester and Leeds (IFF Research 2011).  In recent years, two 
important shifts have taken place in the world of ethnic minority business 
(Zhou, 2004; Jones et al., 2011). Firstly, there have been drastic changes 
in migration flows to the UK as the traditional migrant flows of replacement 
labour from a small handful of countries have been replaced by new 
migrants from dozens of geographically diverse countries driven by a host 
of different motives, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as 
µVXSHUGLYHUVLW\¶ 9HUWRYec, 2007). Because these new populations tend be 
highly educated and often possess transnational contacts, some view them 
as having the potential for mould-breaking enterprise (Sepulveda et al, 
2011), while others predict that they are destined to follow much the same 
GLVDGYDQWDJHG HQWHUSULVH SDWK DV WKH µROG¶ PLJUDQWV -RQHV HW DO 
Secondly, falling levels of self-employment among young UK-born Indians 
coupled with evidence of entry into highly credentialised professional 
careers has led some commentators to suggest that self-employment may 
be a transitional solution for groups new to a society (Jones et al., 
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forthcoming). However, mixed embeddedness theory (Kloosterman, 2010) 
perhaps offers a more realistic view of structure versus culture in the 
creation of ethnic minority business. This theory posits that any firm is 
simultaneously grounded both in its own social capital ± resources supplied 
by family, community and other social ties ± and the wider surrounding 
economic and legal environment of markets and states. Thus, while 
H[SOLFLWO\ DFNQRZOHGJLQJ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V GHEW WR VRFLDO UHODWLRQVKLSV LW
equally insists that the firm must act within parameters laid down by this 
powerful context. Consequently, immigrant-origin firms cannot be viewed 
as unique and subject to their own rules, rather they are simply specific 
versions of a universal genre (Jones et al., 2011).  
While the future of ethnic minority businesses may be subject to debate, 
there is greater certainty about the concerns that they currently face. 
Among these, access to finance is often cited as one of the most significant 
barriers for EMBs (Ram and Jones, 2008; Ram et al., 2011). The most 
detailed study of EMB finance in the UK (Fraser, 2009) highlighted some 
stark findings. First, credit outcomes were found to be worse for 
entrepreneurs from particular ethnic groups, with Black African firms more 
than four times as likely as White firms to be denied a loan outright, while 
Black Caribbean, Bangladeshi and Pakistani firms were also found to be 
disproportionately more likely to have loan applications denied. Despite 
these findings, direct discrimination was not found to be the cause. Instead, 
standard risk factors such as age of business and financial track records 
accounted for discrepancies between different ethnic minority groups. As 
)UDVHUUHSRUWHG³7KHDQDO\VLVRIORDQGHQLDOVDQGLQWHUHVWUDWHV
points to differences in creditworthiness, not ethnic discrimination, as the 
probable explanation foUSRRUHU(0%FUHGLWRXWFRPHV´ 
:RPHQ¶VHQWHUSULVHFDQEHGLIILFXOWWRSUHFLVHO\GHILQHDQGHQXPHUDWHEXW
LW LV HVWLPDWHG WKDW DERXW  RI WKH 8.¶V  PLOOLRQ HQWHUSULVHV DUH
women-OHGDQGWKDWZRPHQFRPSULVHDERXWRIWKH8.¶VVHOI-employed 
population. Despite many initiatives to increase the number of women in 
enterprise, men are still almost twice as likely to start businesses as 
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women. As with EMBs, access to finance is regarded as the major obstacle 
preventing women from starting and growing a successful enterprise 
(Marlow and Patton, 2005; Hughes et al., 2012). Although access to 
finance appears to be gender neutral, research has shown that women 
perceive higher financial barriers to business ownership (Roper et al., 
 DQG DQ DQDO\VLV RI *(0 GDWD GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW µEHLQJ IHmale 
increases the probability that an individual will perceive financial barriers to 
business start-XS E\ DURXQG  SHUFHQWDJH SRLQWV¶ 5RSHU DQG 6FRWW
2009). Studies have consistently shown that women-owned businesses 
start with lower levels of overall capitalization (Carter et al, 2007), use lower 
ratios of debt finance (Rosa et al, 1996), and are much less likely to use 
private equity or venture capital (Brush et al, 2001).  
Studies investigating gender-based differences in business financing have 
focused on two related themes. Early studies of gender, entrepreneurship 
and finance sought to unravel the complex relationship between gender 
and bank finance with regard to the volume of finance lent, the terms of 
credit negotiated and the perceived attitudes of bank lending officers to 
female entrepreneurs (Orser and Foster, 1994; Fabowale et al., 1995; 
Coleman, 2000). More recently, researchers have attempted to 
demonstrate whether gender-based differences are a consequence of 
supply-side discrimination by bank lenders, demand-side aversion to debt 
or risk by women entrepreneurs, or simply the result of structurally 
dissimilar businesses owned by men and women (Wilson et al., 2007).  
The view that finance differences between men and women are explained 
by their ownership of structurally diverse businesses has dominated much 
of the debate (Watson, 2002; Johnsen and McMahon, 2005). Recent 
studies by BDRC Continental (2012) and Marlow et al (2012) have 
continued the well-rehearsed view that finance differences between male 
and female owned businesses are best explained as a product of 
differences in business size, age and sector. Intriguingly, however, studies 
using matched samples of male and female entrepreneurs report residual 
gender differences even after structural factors have been controlled (see 
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Carter et al., 2007 for a review). In a sophisticated attempt to unpack the 
debate as to whether it is structure or gender that determines finance 
outcomes, Wu and Chua (2012: 459) identify the presence of second-order 
JHQGHU HIIHFWV LQ 86 VPDOO EXVLQHVV ERUURZLQJ FRVWV DUJXLQJ WKDW ³WKH
µJHQGHULQJ¶ RI VWUXFWXUH LV LWVHOI DJHQGHU HIIHFW´ 7KLV VWXG\ KDV SRZHUIXO
implications; arguments that variations in bank lending are a consequence 
of structure and not gender become meaningless if gender and structure 
are coterminous. Alternative explanations for different finance outcomes 
have asserted that supply-side gender discrimination may account for the 
different finance profiles between men and women (Hertz, 2011), though 
there is virtually no evidence to support this claim. Finally, demand-side risk 
aversion (Cliff, 1998; Bird and Brush, 2002), more accurately described as 
debt avoidance, has been mooted as the cause of gender based finance 
differences. This perspective has some indirect empirical support as it has 
been well established that the comparatively lower earnings of women in 
employment (Perrons, 2009) are reproduced among the female self-
employed (Marlow, 1997; Parker, 2004). 
3. DIVERSE ENTERPRISES AND DISCOURAGEMENT 
Given the concerns noted within both the EMB and, to a lesser extent, the 
gender and entrepreneurship literature regarding the proportion of 
discouraged borrowers within these groups, it is worth considering some of 
the recent research regarding financial discouragement within the SME 
sector. Current interest in discouraged borrowers dates from Kon and 
6WRUH\¶VVHPLQDOZRUNLGHQWLI\LQJWKHFRQGLWLRQVLQZKLFKWKHUHLVWKH
potential for discouraged borrowers to exist. These conditions include both 
demand side factors (application costs varying between firms), and supply 
side factors (imperfect screening of applicants by banks) resulting in good 
borrowers failing to apply for bank lending because they believe they will be 
rejected. Information asymmetries are central to understanding the causes 
of discouraged borrowing. The lack of availability of reliable information 
DERXW VPDOO EXVLQHVVHV ZKLFK KDYH EHHQ GHVFULEHG DV µLQIRUPDWLRQDOO\
RSDTXH¶ +DQ HW DO  DQG WKH FRQVHTXHQW LQability of banks to 
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accurately appraise the quality of small business borrowers gives rise to 
discouragement. Kon and Storey (2003: 37) argued that the scale of 
GLVFRXUDJHPHQWZDVDW LWVJUHDWHVW ³ZKHUH WKHUH LVVRPHEXWQRWSHUIHFW
LQIRUPDWLRQ´'LVFXVVions of discouragement have focused on the extent to 
which discouraged borrowers share greater resemblance to rejected 
applicants or to accepted borrowers. Using the US Survey of Small 
Business Finances, Han et al., (2008: 415) reported that riskier borrowers 
KDGKLJKHUOHYHOVRIGLVFRXUDJHPHQWFRQFOXGLQJWKDWµGLVFRXUDJHPHQWLVDQ
efficient self-UDWLRQLQJPHFKDQLVP¶$ ODWHUVWXG\XVLQJ WKH&DQDGLDQ60(
Financing Data Initiative dataset similarly found discouraged borrowers to 
be generally smaller and riskier than applicants (Chandler, 2010), while an 
DQDO\VLVRI WKH:RUOG%DQN¶V(QWHUSULVH6XUYH\VVKRZHGROGHUDQG ODUJHU
firms to be less likely to be discouraged (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2012). 
:KLOHGLVFRXUDJHPHQWRIµEDG¶ERUURZHUVLVZLGHO\EHOLHYHGWRGemonstrate 
PDUNHWHIILFLHQF\ WKHGLVFRXUDJHPHQWRI µJRRG¶ERUURZHUV LVSUREOHPDWLF
Understanding the characteristics of discouraged borrowers is vital in 
assessing whether or not discouragement is problematic. Given that the 
SME sector is largely characterized by firms where ownership and 
management is undertaken by a single person or small team of (often) 
family members, the characteristics of discouraged borrowers include both 
firm level and personal attributes.  
Studies of discouragement drawn from UK datasets confirm that the 
likelihood of discouragement diminishes with firm size (Freel et al., 2010), 
but also point to a number of distinguishing characteristics of discouraged 
borrowers including firm-level strategy, industry sector, prior 
entrepreneurial experience and perceived quality of existing banking 
relationships. Of particular note to this review is the reported finding that 
24% of female-owned businesses, compared with fewer than 14% of male-
owned firms, were discouraged, a fact explained by the greater prevalence 
of cost-based strategies used by female-led firms rather than gender alone 
(Freel et al., 2010). The view that discouragement may be associated with 
particular characteristics of business owners was given greater support by 
)UDVHU¶V 009) analysis of the UK Survey of SME Finances (UKSMEF) 
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which found rates of discouragement to be higher among EMBs than 
among White firms, with 44% of Black African, 39% of Black Caribbean, 
31% of Bangladeshi, 21% of Pakistani and 9% of Indian firms compared to 
4% of White firms reporting that fear of rejection had led them to not apply 
for loans. Controlling for the effects of other explanatory factors, such as 
poorer credit worthiness, ethnicity remained a key explanatory factor for 
discouragement, particularly for Black Caribbean firms and, to a lesser 
extent, Indian firms. However, the focus on personal characteristics of 
owners as a determinant of discouragement was challenged by Van 
+XOWHQ¶V DQDO\VLVRI60(ILQDQFH LQ$XVWUDOLDZKLFK IRXQG WKDW not 
only did gender not influence the probability of reporting denial, 
discouragement or financial constraint, female migrants were also no more 
likely to report discouragement. 
4. A TYPOLOGY OF SME BANK BORROWING 
This analysis of the SME Finance Monitor is intended to provide further 
insights into the perceptions and experiences of diverse enterprises 
regarding access to finance. The SME Finance Monitor is a large-scale UK-
wide quarterly survey of SMEs undertaken by BDRC Continental, 
commissioned following the Banking Taskforce Report and the green paper 
µ)LQDQFLQJ D 3ULYDWH 6HFWRU 5HFRYHU\¶ KWWSZZZVPH-finance-
monitor.co.uk/). The first nine waves of the survey used in this analysis 
provide a usable sample in excess of 45,000 cases. To ensure a 
representative sample, quotas are set by sector and region then allocated 
within employee size bands. The resulting sample is weighted to ensure 
representativeness to the total UK SME population based on BIS SME 
data. The SME Finance Monitor does not apply quotas or weightings to 
personal characteristics of owners, such as gender or ethnicity, however, 
the overall proportions of female and EMB owners within the survey 
population closely match those within the overall UK SME population. 
Small Business Survey data from 2012 shows that 21% of businesses with 
no employees and 19% of businesses with employees were majority 
women-led and 8% of all SMEs were EMB led, though the proportions 
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varied from 16% of very young businesses (less than 1 year) to 5% of 
mature businesses (over 20 years).     
The starting point in this analysis of the SME Finance Monitor was to 
develop a typology of SME borrowers which encapsulated the entire 
population of SMEs as the notional demand for borrowing (Figure 1). As 
Figure 1 shows, the notional demand for borrowing is initially broken down 
into three different groups: Patent Demand, a category of SMEs who have 
made an application for bank credit irrespective of outcome; Partial 
Demand, a category of SMEs that have successfully applied for some bank 
credit but had not applied for all the bank borrowing they required; and 
Latent Demand, a category of SMEs that are currently non-borrowers and 
non-applicants for bank credit.  
The Patent Demand group can be further broken down into three 
categories (row 2): Extant borrowers who have made no new application 
for credit within the past 12 months; New/Renewed Borrowers, SMEs that 
have successfully made a new or a renewed application for finance within 
the past 12 months; and Newly Declined Borrowers, applicants for bank 
credit who have been declined by the bank or who have declined the 
EDQN¶VRIIHURIFUHGit (row 3).  
The Partial Borrowers group comprises SMEs who are simultaneously both 
successful applicants, having successfully applied for some borrowing 
facility, but who also exhibit debt-aversion as they do not apply for all of the 
funding they require or they require but do not apply for a different type of 
funding mechanism.  
The Latent Demand group can be broken down into two separate 
categories of Indifferent Borrowers and Potential Borrowers (row 2). 
Indifferent Borrowers comprises SMEs with no present need for bank 
credit, of which some will be Listless Non-Borrowers having never applied 
for bank credit and some will be Defunct Borrowers having previously used 
bank credit but have no present need (row 3). Of this latter group, some will 
have ceased borrowing having repaid the debt and some will have been 
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dismissed (row 4). The category of Indifferent Borrowers closely resembles 
µ+DSS\ 1RQ-6HHNHUV¶ ZKLOH WKH FDWHJRU\ RI /LVWOHVV 1RQ-Borrowers 
RYHUODSV ZLWK WKH µ3HUPDQHQW 1RQ-%RUURZHU¶ JURXS LGHQWLILHG LQ WKH 60(
Finance Monitor Q3 2013 report (BDRC, 2013). The Potential Borrowers 
category of SMEs who require credit but have made no formal application 
can be broken down into two categories of Disinterested Borrowers who 
need finance but prefer non-bank sources so do not apply for bank 
borrowing, and Discouraged Borrowers who need and want bank credit but 
certain factors discourage their application. Discouraged Borrowers can be 
further segmented into two categories of the Directly Discouraged and the 
Indirectly Discouraged (row 4). Directly Discouraged SMEs have been 
directly discouraged by direct bank actions, either because they have been 
Dissuaded by bank personnel from applying for bank credit or they are 
Disillusioned because a previous application for bank credit had been 
rejected with the rejection handled so poorly by the bank that the borrower 
is discouraged from applying again (row 5). SMEs that are Indirectly 
Discouraged by non-bank factors can be further segmented into four 
categories: those that believe banks offer Undesirable Deals, unsuitable 
products, prices or procedures; Self-Diagnosed SMEs, the classic 
discouraged category whose self-evaluation suggests that they would be 
declined; Daunted SMEs who are intimidated by perceived notions of the 
complexities of bank borrowing, such as highly demanding and legalistic 
terms and conditions; and Distracted SMEs who are discouraged for a 
range of other reasons, including media reports and hearsay about the 
difficulties of bank borrowing and consequently predict the likely rejection of 
any bank application. 
This typology of borrowers identifies a potentially larger pool of discouraged 
borrowers than has previously been acknowledged, in so far as it includes 
both potential borrowers and partial borrowers. The typology also identifies 
a wider range of causes of discouragement than has previously been 
identified. While the research literature has not previously differentiated 
between types of discouragement, bank practice has started to differentiate 
between direct and indirect discouragement, where direct discouragement 
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is a consequence of bank dissuasion and indirect discouragement is a 
consequence of other reasons such as media reports or hearsay 
(encapsulated in this typology as distracted SMEs). Using this new 
typology as the basis of a re-analysis of the SME Finance Monitor enables 
some insight into the scale and importance of different types of 
discouragement. 
5. EVIDENCE FROM THE SME FINANCE MONITOR 
The distribution of borrowers across the categories in this typology is 
shown in Figure 2. This figure shows that across the three main categories 
of borrower, the largest fraction of SMEs (49%) are non-borrowers and in 
the category of Latent Demand, 45% of SMEs are new and existing 
borrowers and within the category of Patent Demand, and 6% of SMEs 
come into the category of Partial Demand, having successfully applied for 
some bank facility but requiring either further funding or a different facility 
without making a further application. For reasons of caution, partial 
borrowers were not included within the potential borrower group but were 
treated as their own analytical category. 
Of those SMEs within the Patent Demand category, 22% of the total 
sample (50% of Patent Demand) are existing borrowers who have made no 
new application within the past twelve months, 20% of the total sample 
(44% of Patent Demand) are new borrowers having made a successful 
application within the past twelve months, while just 2% of the total sample 
(5% of Patent Demand) are within the Declined Borrowers group. Of these, 
the largest proportion (1.6% of the total sample, 72% of Declined 
Borrowers) was rejected by the bank, while 0.6% of the total sample (28% 
RI'HFOLQHG%RUURZHUVUHMHFWHGDEDQN¶VRIIHURIILQDQFH 
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Within the Latent Demand category, the largest proportion of SMEs is 
within the Indifferent Borrowers category which accounts for 36% of the 
total sample (71% of Latent Demand). Of these, 33% of the total sample 
(92% of Indifferent Borrowers) are Listless Non-Borrowers, having never 
applied for bank finance, while 3% of the total sample (8% of Indifferent 
Borrowers) are prior users of bank credit but have no present need for this 
facility. Potential Borrowers account for 14% of the total sample (29% of 
Latent Demand), of which 6% of the total sample (44% of Potential 
Borrowers) are Disinterested Borrowers, while 8% of the total sample (56% 
of Potential Borrowers) are Discouraged Borrowers. Among Discouraged 
Borrowers, relatively few (1% of the total sample, 11% of Discouraged 
Borrowers) are directly discouraged by banks either dissuading them 
against application (0.8% of total sample) or through disillusionment having 
been rejected in the past (0.2% of total sample). A larger proportion of 
Discouraged Borrowers are indirectly discouraged by non-bank factors (7% 
of the total sample, 89% of Disheartened Borrowers). Of this group, the 
largest proportion is distracted by the media reports or hearsay (4.6% of 
total sample, 65% of Disheartened Borrowers), and the next largest 
proportion self-diagnose their likelihood of rejection (1% of total sample, 
17% of Discouraged Borrowers). Very few SMEs are either discouraged by 
undesirable deals and unsuitable products, prices or procedures (1% of 
total sample, 13% of Discouraged Borrowers) or daunted by notions of 
what bank borrowing entails (0.4% of total sample, 5% of Discouraged 
Borrowers). 
6. WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESS AND FINANCE 
An analysis of the SME Finance Monitor using this typology allows some 
insight into the financing issues facing diverse enterprises. The six main 
categories of borrower identified in row 2 of Figure 1 and Figure 2 are used 
as main analytical groups (existing borrowers, new borrowers, declined 
borrowers, partial borrowers, potential (debt-avoiding) borrowers, indifferent 
non-borrowers). This section describes the data analysis for women-owned 
businesses. 
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Table 1 presents the distribution of borrower types by gender of owner. As 
mentioned above, the proportion of female owners within the survey is on a 
par with that of UK enterprises as a whole (18%). In addition to the 
identification of male and female business-owners, the SME Finance 
Monitor also captures businesses that are jointly owned by men and 
women (3.2% of all sampled firms). This is notably fewer jointly owned 
firms than is observed in the 2012 Small Business Survey where 16% of 
businesses with no employees and 23% of businesses with employees 
were equally co-owned. Nevertheless, this category provides a useful 
counterpoint for the analysis of gender and how these joint partnerships 
compare with their male and female only counterparts may provide a 
different insight into the data. 
Table 1: Distribution of Borrower Type by Gender 
Gender 
Existing 
Borrowers 
New / 
renewed 
Borrowers 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial 
Borrowers 
Potential 
(debt-
averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent 
Non-
borrowers Total 
Male 
8,142 
(18%) 
7,173 
(16%) 
826 
(2%) 
2,143 
(5%) 
4,832 
(11%) 
12,192 
(27%) 
35,308 
(79%) 
Female 
1,573 
(3%) 
1,414  
(3%) 
161  
(0.4%) 
503 
(1%) 
1301 
(3%) 
3246 
(7%) 
8198 
(18%) 
Joint 
Partners 
307 
(0.7%) 
384 
(1%) 
18  
(0.04%) 
99 
(0.2%) 
199 
(0.4%) 
437 
(1%) 
1,444 
(3.2%) 
Total 
10,022 
(22%) 
8,971 
(20%) 
1,005  
(2%) 
2,745 
(6%) 
6,332 
(14%) 
15,875 
(35%) 
44,950 
(100%) 
Pearson chi2(10) = 203.6322 P = 0.000         
 
Between male-led and female-led firms, however, there are readily 
observable differences in terms of the distribution of borrower types. In 
particular, while the male-female ratio of existing borrowers and newly 
accepted/renewed borrowers is roughly 6:1 (at 18:3 and 16:3 per cent 
respectively), more undesirable borrower types appear to relatively 
disfavour women. Both the male - female ratios of declined and partial 
borrowing are 5:1, worsening further to under 4:1 for debt-aversion and 
indifferent non-borrowing. Indeed, statistically, the Chi-square test suggests 
that there is a likely underlying relationship between gender and borrower 
type as the shares observed are different from what would be expected if 
they were truly independent of each other. As such, gender may have an 
influence RQILUP¶VERUURZLQJEHKDYLRXU 
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This can be analysed further by comparing absolute differences in the rates 
of the various types of borrowing categories for males, females and joint 
partners with those observed at the sample level with gender unspecified. 
A crucial caveat here is that the sample, and indeed the market, is 
dominated by male-led firms. Notwithstanding the larger question of the 
overall participation rates by gender, it would appear that key imbalances 
stand out. Women-led firms are underrepresented in the successful 
borrower categories, i.e. the existing and new/renewed borrowers, and 
over-represented in the discouraged borrowers and the indifferent non-
borrower groups. The shares of women-led firms in the existing and 
new/renewed borrower groups are about 3 percentage points lower than 
the rates observed at the sample level. In relative terms, female 
representation in both existing and new/renewed borrowing arrangements 
is 14% lower than the overall sample norm. The incidence of debt-
avoidance among women-led firms is also 12.6% higher than the incidence 
of debt-avoidance observed among all firms regardless of gender. There is 
also an overrepresentation of women in firms that are not borrowing at all 
as they have no present need for credit. This suggests that female-led firms 
may be characterised by other weaknesses, such as low or no growth, 
hence these high non-need rates, more than is the case generally. An 
encouraging point, nevertheless, is that rejection rates are 12.5% lower 
than normal for women. Better still, jointly owned male and female 
partnerships have an almost 7% absolute advantage over everybody else 
in new/renewed acceptance rates. This is complemented by 44% lower 
rejection rates.  
There are indications, further, that small firms jointly led by men and 
women have relative advantages, perhaps relating to superior size and 
scale or to the nature of family ownership. This may be conjectured from 
the rates of new/renewed borrowing as well as rates of indifferent non-
borrowing. Whilst non-borrowing attributable to non-need is high among 
female-led firms, for male and female jointly led firms such investment 
indifference is 14% lower than the prevailing indifference among all small 
firms. In fact, the relative incidence of indifferent non-borrowing among 
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male-female collaborations is far lower than that observed among firms led 
by male managers. Simultaneously, while only 20% of all firms fall under 
the new/renewed borrowers group, almost 27% of jointly led firms have 
managed to either secure a new facility or have a successful renewal in the 
last year. Nevertheless, the rate of partial borrowing among jointly led firms 
is a percentage point higher than for all firms. 
An alternative way of assessing gender differences in borrowing behaviour 
is to compare the rates applying to a given borrower category against the 
overall enterprise participation rate applying to the given gender group 
(Table 2). Here, the representativeness of participation is not considered. 
Rather, we seek to uncover further imbalances within the already gender 
skewed enterprise landscape. The data suggests that male-led firms 
express their borrowing demands disproportionately more than their 
enterprise rates would suggest. In contrast, for female-led firms, rates of 
latency with respect to borrowing are higher than the rates of participation 
in enterprise. Thus, while the sample suggests that women account for 
18.2% of all firms, when it comes to the sub-groups of potential borrowers 
and indifferent non-borrowers, female-led firms account for over 20% of 
such firms. Male-led firms on the other hand have disproportionately higher 
representation in the existing borrowers, newly accepted/renewed 
borrowers as well as the declined borrower categories. While the latter may 
not be a desirable category, it is possible that lessons learned in the 
borrowing process are themselves valuable and may over-compensate the 
adversities of rejection. Indeed, only 2.2% of all firms are declined 
borrowers (comprising less than 10% of all new applicants) and only 0.2% 
of all firms cite past rejection as a reason for debt-avoidance. Most 
borrowing attempts can therefore be said to be fruitful, directly by securing 
the desired credit, or indirectly by learning from the process. Female-led 
firms not participating in this process at all may fail to secure funding for 
their businesses and also fail to acquire useful knowledge and experience 
as well as the opportunity to build a borrowing record. 
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Table 2: Borrower Type by Gender and Participation Rates 
Gender 
Borrower 
Neutral 
(Enterprise 
participation 
rates) 
Existing 
Borrowers 
Newly 
Accepted/ 
renewed 
Borrowers 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial 
Borrowers 
Potential 
(Debt-
averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent 
Non-
borrowers 
Male 78.6% +2.7% +1.4% +3.6% -0.5% -2.2% -1.8% 
Female 18.2% -2.5% -2.5% -2.2% +0.1% +2.3% +2.2% 
Joint 
Partners 3.2% -0.2% +1.1% -1.4% +0.4% -0.1% -0.5% 
Total 100.0%             
 
For firms that do apply for bank borrowing, there may be some prima facie 
gender-related biases in the amount requested (Table 3). The male-female 
ratio of amount requested appears to diverge as the amount increases. For 
sums below £5,000, the ratio is roughly 3:1. This increases to 4:1 for 
amounts lower than £25,000, then 5:1 for sums of up to £100,000, beyond 
which the male-female ratio diverges even further to about 8.4 to 1. As 
Table 4 further demonstrates, there is a clear over-representation of 
women requesting lower volumes of finance, and disproportionately low 
participation rates in requests for higher bands of finance volume. For 
women-led firms the share of borrowers requesting more than £100,000 is 
43% lower than the sample average and 43% lower than what would be 
expected of women if general enterprise participation rates were expected 
to apply in the amount borrowed categories as well. If women had the 
same representation in requesting sums above £100,000 as their 
enterprise participation rates, the frequency for this band would have been 
565 as opposed to the 325 returned by the present sample. It is notable 
that relatively few male and female jointly led firms also return high 
comparative differences. 
The ostensible gender bias in volume requested follows the same pattern 
in terms of credit supplied. For lower amounts of credit, the ratio of male to 
female is 3:1. Since the overall enterprise ratio is roughly 4:1, the relative 
over-representation of women in the lower bands is evident (Tables 5-6). 
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Table 3: Amount Requested by Gender 
Amount 
requested/ 
Gender 
Not 
applicable 
Less 
than 
£5,000 
£5,000 -
£9,999 
£10,000- 
£24,999 
£25,000-
£49,999 
£50,000- 
£99,999 
Above 
£100,000  Total 
Male 
28,320 906 675 1,224 877 847 2,651 35,500 
(62.7%) (2.0%) (1.5%) (2.7%) (1.9%) (1.9%) (5.9%) (78.6%) 
Female 
6,778 313 165 301 173 176 325 8,231 
(15.0%) (0.7%) (0.4%) (0.7%) (0.4%) (0.4%) (0.7%) (18.2%) 
Joint 
Partners 
1,096 29 27 69 56 46 129 1,452 
(2.4%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.2%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.3%) (3.2%) 
Total 36,194 1,248 867 1,594 1,106 1,069 3,105 45,183 
 (80.1%) (2.8%) (1.9%) (3.5%) (2.4%) (2.4%) (6.9%) (100.0%) 
Pearson chi2(12) = 209.0723 Pr = 0.000 
     
 
 
 
Table 4: Amount Requested by Gender and Participation Rates 
 
 
 
Table 5: Amount Supplied by Gender 
Amount 
Requested
/ Gender 
Not 
applicable 
Less 
than 
£5,000 
£5,000 -
£9,999 
£10,000 - 
£24,999 
£25,000 -
£49,999 
£50,000 ± 
£99,999 
£100,000 
and 
above Total 
Male 29,668 633 522 977 765 705 2,230 35,500 
 
(65.7%) (1.4%) (1.2%) (2.2%) (1.7%) (1.6%) (4.9%) (78.6%) 
Female 7,037 240 124 253 150 152 275 8,231 
 
(15.6%) (0.5%) (0.3%) (0.6%) (0.3%) (0.3%) (0.6%) (18.2%) 
Partners 1,130 26 29 55 54 41 117 1,452 
 
(2.5%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.3%) (3.2%) 
Total 37,835 899 675 1,285 969 898 2,622 45,183 
 
(83.7%) (2.0%) (1.5%) (2.8%) (2.1%) (2.0%) (5.8%) (100.0%) 
Pearson chi2(12) = 201.7578 P = 0.000           
 
  
Amount 
demanded/ 
Gender 
Enterprise 
participation 
rates 
Not 
applicable 
Less 
than 
£5,000 
£5,000 -
£9,999 
£10,000 - 
£24,999 
£25,000 -
£49,999 
£50,000 - 
£99,999 
£100,000 
and 
above 
Male 78.57 -0.4% -7.6% -0.9% -2.3% +0.9% +0.8% +8.7% 
Female 18.22 +2.8% +37.7% +4.4% +3.6% -14.2% -9.7% -42.5% 
Partners 3.21 -5.6% -27.7% -3.1% +34.9% +57.6% +34.0% +29.3% 
 
 
The financing of diverse enterprises 
 
 23 
Table 6: Amount Supplied by Gender and Participation Rates 
Amount 
Requested  
/Gender 
Enterprise 
participation 
rates 
Not 
applicable 
Less 
than 
£5,000 
£5,000 
-
£9,999 
£10,000 
- 
£24,999 
£25,000 
-
£49,999 
£50,000 
± 
£99,999 
£100,000 
and 
above 
Male 78.6% -0.2% -10.4% -1.6% -3.2% +% -0.1% +8% 
Female 18.2% +2% +47% +1% +8% -15.0% -7.1% -42.4% 
Partners 3.2% -6.9% -10.0% +34% +33% +74% +42% +39% 
 
Within the SME Finance Monitor, risk-rating data are provided not by the 
SME but from the external credit rating agency that supplies the dataset 
from which the sample is derived. Borrowing decisions are largely 
dependent on risk assessment, using data-based risk assessment of the 
borrower by external credit-rating agencies. Common complaints among 
SMEs are that these opinions are frequently based on limited and 
sometimes incorrect and inconsistent data and that a perhaps richer and 
assessment of every case on its merits would be fairer. Nevertheless, risk 
ratings remain pivotal in lending decisions. Table 7 suggests that, while no 
direct relationship is pre-supposed, risk-ratings and gender are not 
statistically independent of each other as the relevant frequencies are 
significantly different from what would be expected if risk-rating and gender 
had no relationship. Echoing the earlier finding that female-led firms have 
disproportionately lower participation rates in borrowing processes, the 
data indicates that female-led firms have 21% higher incidences of credit 
anonymity than their enterprise participation rates would stipulate (Table 8). 
This means that while only about 8% of male led firms have an unknown 
credit rating, more than a tenth of female led firms do not have an adequate 
track record or financial information that a financial institution can use to 
approximate a risk-rating for the firm. Female-led firms are also significantly 
under-represented in the minimum and low risk categories. When coupled 
with the high rates of credit anonymity, the general perception that is likely 
to emerge is that female led firms may be too risky to lend to. This data 
supports previous studies of discouragement that have reported the high 
incidence of information opacity among SMEs, though for the first time 
demonstrates the gendered dimension of this. 
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Table 7: Risk-rating by Gender 
Gender Minimum Low Average 
Above 
Average 
Not 
Known Total 
Male 5993 7076 9355 10167 2909 35500 
  (13.3%) (15.7%) (20.7%) (22.5%) (6.4%) (78.6%) 
Female 1147 1413 2288 2512 871 8231 
  (2.5%) (3.1%) (5.1%) (5.6%) (1.9%) (18.2%) 
Joint 
Male/ 296 302 373 310 171 1452 
Female (0.7%) (0.7%) (0.8%) (0.7%) (0.4%) (3.2%) 
Total 7436 8791 12016 12989 3951 45183 
  (16.5%) (19.5%) (26.6%) (28.7%) (8.7%) (100.0%) 
Pearson chi2(8) = 178.7853 P = 0.000       
 
Table 8: Risk-rating by Gender and Participation Rates 
Gender 
Enterprise 
participation 
rates Minimum Low Average 
Above 
Average 
Not 
Known 
Male 78.6% +2.6% +2.4% -0.9% -0.4% -6.3% 
Female 18.2% -15.4% -11.8% +4.5% +6.1% +21.0% 
Partners 3.2% +24.0% +7.2% -3.4% -25.5% +34.9% 
 
7. ETHNIC MINORITY BUSINESSES AND FINANCE 
The SME Finance Monitor started to collect detailed data on ethnicity in 
wave 5 of the quarterly survey. This results in a reduction in the size of the 
usable dataset from around 45,000 cases to just under 25,000 cases. The 
following tables report the findings relating to the perceptions and 
experiences of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) business owners with 
regard to their access to and usage of finance.  As Table 9 shows, the 
largest proportion of the sample (85.8%) defined their ethnic group as 
White British, with White Irish and White Other accounting for a further 6% 
of the sample. The remainder of the sample were distributed across a wide 
range of other ethnic groups, with the largest proportion being Asian Indian 
accounting for 550 cases (2.2% of the total sample). Although small sample 
sizes are a major caveat and hence the results should be treated with 
some caution, the data shows variations by ethnic group across the 
borrower categories. In particular, rates of discouragement are substantially 
higher among certain ethnic groups: Black African (+35.5%), Asian 
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Bangladeshi (+20.1%), Asian Pakistani (+19.7%) and Mixed White and 
African (+17.1%) business owners. Respondents in the Black Other ethnic 
group were both over-represented in the discouraged borrower category 
(+9.6%) and within the unfulfilled borrower category (+14.9%). 
Table 9: Borrower Type by Ethnicity 
  
Ethnicity 
Existing 
Borrowers 
New/ 
renewed 
Borrowers 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial 
Borrowers 
Potential 
(Debt-
averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent 
Non-
borrowers Total 
White 
British 
3,809 3,764 264 1940 4694 6941 21412 
(15.28%) (15.10%) (1.06%) (7.78%) (18.83%) (27.84%) (85.88%) 
White Irish 
95 119 4 77 124 153 572 
(0.38%) (0.48%) (0.02%) (0.31%) (0.50%) (0.61%) (2.29%) 
White Other 
187 131 13 90 243 341 1005 
(0.75%) (0.53%) (0.05%) (0.36%) (0.97%) (1.37%) (4.03%) 
Mixed: 
White 
/Caribbean 
7 2 3 14 13 13 52 
(0.03%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.06%) (0.05%) (0.05%) (0.21%) 
Mixed: 
White / 
African 
4 4 1 6 15 8 38 
(0.02%) (0.02%) (0.00%) (0.02%) (0.06%) (0.03%) (0.15%) 
Mixed: 
White 
/Asian 
17 8 2 6 20 29 82 
(0.07%) (0.03%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.08%) (0.12%) (0.33%) 
Mixed - 
Other 
13 7 1 7 18 25 71 
(0.05%) (0.03%) (0.00%) (0.03%) (0.07%) (0.10%) (0.28%) 
Asian - 
Indian 
80 72 9 55 163 171 550 
(0.32%) (0.29%) (0.04%) (0.22%) (0.65%) (0.69%) (2.21%) 
Asian ± 
Pakistani 
12 14 1 11 45 24 107 
(0.05%) (0.06%) (0.00%) (0.04%) (0.18%) (0.10%) (0.43%) 
Asian - 
Bangladeshi 
6 4 0 3 17 10 40 
(0.02%) (0.02%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.07%) (0.04%) (0.16%) 
Asian Other 
14 13 1 11 27 38 104 
(0.06%) (0.05%) (0.00%) (0.04%) (0.11%) (0.15%) (0.42%) 
Black 
Caribbean 
7 5 1 9 23 18 63 
(0.03%) (0.02%) (0.00%) (0.04%) (0.09%) (0.07%) (0.25%) 
Black 
African 
6 3 2 9 44 12 76 
(0.02%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.04%) (0.18%) (0.05%) (0.30%) 
Black Other 
1 3 1 6 8 6 25 
(0.00%) (0.01%) (0.00%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.02%) (0.10%) 
Chinese 
8 7 1 3 16 22 57 
(0.03%) (0.03%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.06%) (0.09%) (0.23%) 
Other 
Ethnic 
group 
5 6 0 1 3 2 17 
(0.02%) (0.02%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.07%) 
Ethnicity 
unstated 
140 93 5 34 113 277 662 
(0.56%) (0.37%) (0.02%) (0.14%) (0.45%) (1.11%) (2.66%) 
Total 
4411 4255 309 2282 5586 8090 24933 
(17.69%) (17.07%) (1.24%) (9.15%) (22.40%) (32.45%) (100.00%) 
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Table 10 presents summary data showing borrower type by ethnic group 
against the overall enterprise participation rate applying to the given ethnic 
group, and again, the caveats with regard to small sample sizes should be 
noted. This table shows the deviation from expected results of each ethnic 
group across each of the six borrower categories. Among the category of 
existing borrowers, there are substantially fewer than expected within the 
following ethnic groups: Black Other (-80%), Black African (-53%), Mixed 
White and African (-40%), Asian Pakistani (-37%), Black Caribbean (-36%), 
Asian Other (-23%), Chinese (-21%) and Asian Indian (-18%). Within the 
existing borrower category, there are substantially more than expected 
respondents from Other Ethnic Groups (+57%) and Mixed White and Asian 
(+18%). Within the new and renewed borrower category a similar pattern 
emerges, with substantially fewer respondents than expected within the 
following ethnic groups: Black African (-76%), Mixed White and Caribbean 
(-76%), Black Caribbean (-52%), Asian Bangladeshi (-43), Mixed Other (-
42%), and Mixed White and Asian (-42%). The numbers within the declined 
borrower category are so small as to be virtually meaningless and will not 
be discussed.  Similarly, the partial borrower category also contains some 
rows with very small cell sizes, although it is perhaps notable that Asian 
Indians, who comprise a reasonably large cell size within the partial 
borrower category (55) are slightly over-represented within this group 
(+9%). Within the potential borrower category there is a clear over-
representation among certain ethnic groups, including Black African 
(+163%), Asian Pakistani (+88%), Asian Bangladeshi (+87%), and Mixed 
White and African (+80%). 
Tables 11 and 12 present data on the volume of finance requested by 
ethnicity, where the number of ethnic groups has been reduced to two 
broad categories in order to increase cell sizes and aid statistical analyses. 
The largest proportion of both White British and Irish SMEs,  as well as 
minority SMEs, requesting bank finance sought amounts of £100,000 or 
more (5.6%, and 0.6% of all firms respectively). However, relative to their 
participation rates (Table 12), fewer respondents in the broad BME group 
requested the largest volume of finance. Indeed, relative to their numbers, 
 
 
The financing of diverse enterprises 
 
 27 
there were fewer BME applicants than expected across all of the finance 
volume sizes.  This suggests that non-borrowing is highly prevalent 
amongst BME communities. Note that the Not Applicable column includes 
respondents who did not answer the question as it did not apply as well as 
UHIXVHGDQGGRQ¶WNQRZUHVSRQses.  
Tables 13 and 14 show the volume of finance received by broad ethnic 
group. The results indicate that on top of the lower than expected 
application rates, BME business owners had even lower rates of success in 
securing finance of any volume. For example, while the overall business 
participation rate is almost 12%, BME businesses only account for 9% of all 
businesses securing more than £100, 000. BME representation in this 
credit band is therefore 22% lower than the Overall BME participation rate. 
Table 10: Borrower Type by Ethnicity and Participation Rates 
ETHNICITY 
Enterprise 
participation 
rates 
Existing 
Borrowers 
New/ 
renewed 
Borrowers 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial 
Borrowers 
Potential 
Borrowers 
Indifferent 
Non-
borrowers 
White British 85.88% +0.5% +3.0% -0.5% -1.0% -2.2% -0.1% 
White Irish 2.29% 
-6.1% +22.3% -43.7% +47.2% -3.1% -17.5% 
White Other 4.03% +5.2% -23.6% +4.5% -2.2% +7.9% +4.7% 
Mixed - 
White and 
Caribbean 
0.21% 
-23.8% -76.2% +361.9% +190.5% +9.5% -23.8% 
Mixed - 
White and 
African 
0.15% 
-40.0% -40.0% +113.3% +73.3% +80.0% -33.3% 
Mixed - 
White and 
Asian 
0.33% 
+18.2% -42.4% +97.0% -21.2% +9.1% +9.1% 
Mixed - 
Other 0.28% +3.6% -42.9% +14.3% +10.7% +14.3% +10.7% 
Asian ± 
Indian 2.21% -18.1% -23.5% +31.7% +9.0% +32.1% -4.5% 
Asian - 
Pakistani 0.43% -37.2% -23.3% -25.6% +11.6% +88.4% -30.2% 
Asian - 
Bangladeshi 0.16% -12.5% -43.8% -100.0% -18.8% +87.5% -25.0% 
Asian Other 0.42% 
-23.8% -26.2% -23.8% +14.3% +14.3% +11.9% 
Black 
Caribbean 0.25% -36.0% -52.0% +28.0% +56.0% +64.0% -12.0% 
Black African 0.30% 
-53.3% -76.7% +116.7% +30.0% +163.3% -50.0% 
Black Other 0.10% 
-80.0% -30.0% +220.0% +160.0% +40.0% -30.0% 
Chinese 0.23% 
-21.7% -30.4% +39.1% -43.5% +26.1% +17.4% 
Other Ethnic 
group 0.07% +57.1% +100.0% -100.0% -42.9% -28.6% -71.4% 
Ethnicity 
unstated 2.66% +19.2% -17.7% -39.1% -44.0% -24.1% +28.6% 
Total 100% 
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Table 11: Amount Requested by Ethnicity 
 
Table 12: Amount Requested by Ethnicity and Participation Rates 
Amount 
demanded 
/Ethnicity 
Enterprise 
participation 
rates 
Not 
applicable 
Less 
than 
£5,000 
£5,000 -
£9,999 
£10,000 - 
£24,999 
£25,000 
-£49,999 
£50,000  
£99,999 
£100,000 
and 
above 
White 
British/ 
Irish 88.17% -0.6% +0.9% +0.9% +3.5% +2.9% +4.5% +2.4% 
Black and 
Minority 
Ethnic 11.83% +4.6% -6.5% -7.0% -26.5% -21.7% -33.3% -17.8% 
Total 100.00%        
 
 
Table 13: Amount Supplied by Ethnicity 
Amount 
supplied/ 
Ethnicity 
Not 
applicable 
Less 
than 
£5,000 
£5,000 -
£9,999 
£10,000 - 
£24,999 
£25,000 -
£49,999 
£50,000- 
£99,999 
£100k 
and 
above Total 
White 
British/ Irish 
18,296 559 376 701 471 452 1,216 22,071 
73.1% 2.2% 1.5% 2.8% 1.9% 1.8% 4.9% 88.2% 
Black and 
Minority 
Ethnic 
2,622 49 37 54 40 36 123 2,961 
10.5% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.5% 11.8% 
Total 20,918 608 413 755 511 488 1,339 25,032 
 83.6% 2.4% 1.6% 3.0% 2.0% 1.9% 5.3% 100.0% 
 
         Pearson chi2(6) =  63.4525 Pr = 0.000 
    
 
Amount 
requested/ 
Ethnicity 
Not 
applicable 
Less 
than 
£5,000 
£5,000 -
£9,999 
£10,000-  
£24,999 
£25,000 -
£49,999 
£50,000- 
£99,999 
£100,000 
and 
above 
Total 
White 
British/ 
Irish 
17,605 708 461 840 529 525 1,403 22,071 
70.3% 2.8% 1.8% 3.4% 2.1% 2.1% 5.6% 88.2% 
Black and 
Minority 
Ethnic 
2,486 88 57 80 54 45 151 2,961 
9.9% 0.4% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 11.8% 
Total 20,091 796 518 920 583 570 1,554 25,032 
 
80.3% 3.2% 2.1% 3.7% 2.3% 2.3% 6.2% 100.0% 
         Pearson chi2(6) =  33.9593 P = 0.000 
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Table 14: Amount Supplied by Participation Rates 
Amount 
supplied/ 
Ethnicity 
Enterprise 
participation 
rates 
Not  
applicable 
Less 
than 
£5,000 
£5,000 -
£9,999 
£10,000 - 
£24,999 
£25,000 -
£49,999 
£50,000 ± 
£99,999 
£100,000 
and 
above 
White 
British/ 
Irish 88.17% -0.8% +4.3% +3.3% +5.3% +4.5% +5.0% +3.0% 
Black 
and 
Minority 
Ethnic 11.83% +5.9% -31.9% -24.3% -39.6% -33.8% -37.6% -22.3% 
Total 100.0%        
 
Tables 15 and 16 show risk ratings by broad ethnic groups, highlighting the 
frequency of occurrence in each risk rating categories by broad ethnic 
group (Table 15) and deviation from expected risk rating group by 
participation rates (Table 16). These tables show similar results but in 
rather different ways. While 29% of SMEs as a whole bear the above 
average risk rating, within the BME group the share of firms rated as above 
average is 35%, representing a 19% higher share of risky businesses than 
the enterprise participation rate. 
Table 15: Risk-ratings by Ethnicity 
Ethnicity Minimum Low Average 
Above 
Average 
Not 
Known Total 
White British/ 
Irish 3,618 4,315 5,897 6,301 1,940 22,071 
 
14.5% 17.2% 23.6% 25.2% 7.8% 88.2% 
Black and 
Minority 
Ethnic 
469 482 744 1,029 237 2,961 
 1.9% 1.9% 3.0% 4.1% 0.9% 11.8% 
Total 4,087 4,797 6,641 7,330 2,177 25,032 
  16.3% 19.2% 26.5% 29.3% 8.7% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(42) = 53.7289 P = 0.000 
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Table 16: Risk-rating by Ethnicity and Participation Rates 
Ethnicity 
Enterprise 
participation 
rates Minimum Low Average 
Above 
Average 
Not 
Known 
White 
British/ Irish 88.17% +0.4% +2.0% +0.7% -2.5% +1.1% 
 Black and 
Minority 
Ethnic 11.83% -3.0% 
-
15.0% -5.3% +18.7% -7.9% 
Total 100.0%      
 
8. MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
The descriptive analysis reported above strongly suggests that both gender 
and ethnicity have an effect on the borrowing behaviour of small firms; 
however, it is possible that gender and ethnicity mask other factors that 
influence finance related outcomes. Prior studies have demonstrated that 
gender and ethnicity effects noted at the bivariate level, are no longer 
significant when other factors are included within the analysis (Fraser, 
2009; Freel et al., 2012). A basic multinomial regression technique is used 
here in an attempt to uncover these effects. Given that gender and ethnicity 
DUH LQKHUHQWO\ µJLYHQV¶ LQWHUHVW KHUH LV IRFXVHG RQ HVWDEOLVKLQJ WKH
relationship between the various firm-level factors, such as sector, legal 
form, employment size, business age, business planning, that may have 
effect on finance outcomes.  
In Table 17, the borrowing categories are regressed excluding any other 
factors. This produces the intercept only results where all other factors are 
not considered. The base borrower category is new/renewed borrowers. 
The results suggest that SMEs are more likely to secure credit than get 
declined, less likely to be partial borrowers relative to new/renewed 
borrowers, and less likely to be debt-averse than a successful borrower. 
However, with other factors unconsidered, a random SME is more likely to 
be an indifferent non-borrower with no investment needs than a successful 
borrower.  
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Table 18 investigates a scenario where only the gender of the business-
owner is considered a factor in SME borrowing. Here, the results suggest 
that even when not accounting for other factors, women business owners 
are no more likely than men to have their applications for financing 
rejected. However, the relative risk of partial borrowing, debt-avoidance 
and indifferent non-need of finance is higher amongst women compared to 
men.   
Table 19 assesses the situation when only ethnicity is considered a factor 
with all others unheeded. Compared to White British and Irish business 
owners, the relative risk of rejection, partial borrowing, debt-avoidance and 
investment indifference over recent success in securing credit is higher 
amongst Black and Minority Ethnic entrepreneurs. BME businesses are 
also more likely to have existing facilities than new ones, suggesting that 
there is less dynamic borrowing activity amongst BME businesses.  
Table 20 includes gender and ethnicity together. Here, the estimated 
relative risk ratios changed somewhat suggesting that there are some 
gender effects accounted for by ethnicity and vice versa. Table 20a 
therefore investigates the interaction effects between gender and ethnicity. 
The reference category is WBI Male. The results suggest that while both 
WBI Female and BME Females are no more likely to be declined credit 
than WBI Males, BME Females have a higher relative risk of being partial 
borrowers, debt-averse potential borrowers, and indifferent non-borrowers. 
Indeed, although BME Males have a statistically significant higher relative 
risk of rejection compared to WBI Males while BME Females do not, the 
relative risk of partial borrowing, debt-aversion and indifference is highest 
amongst BME Females. On the whole, it would appear that women 
business-owners borrow less but those that do are just as likely to secure 
finance as White British and Irish Males. Curiously, however, there are no 
statistically significant differences in terms of borrowing outcomes between 
businesses run jointly by BME male and female partners and those run by 
WBI Males. Besides the BME Males rejection, it is clear that BME Females 
fare worse than other businesses.  
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Although there is debate on the meaningfulness of the Pseudo R-Squared 
estimated in non-linear models, it is worth noting that the Pseudo R-
Squared figure of 0.003 obtained by regressing borrower type on gender 
and ethnicity suggests that these two variables do very little (less than half 
a percentage point) in terms of accounting for the variability of SME 
borrower types. Given that a relative risk ratio of 1 suggests that the 
relative risk of being in the category in question and not the base one is the 
same from the perspective of the variable under consideration, it would 
appear that even within an estimation with a low goodness of fit, the effect 
of gender and ethnicity is yet rather small. Thus, the bulk of the variability in 
finance outcomes may not be a product of gender and ethnicity, and 
exploring the effect of other factors may be more illuminating. 
As noted earlier, prior studies have found that structural factors, such as 
the sector in which the firm operates, play a larger role in determining 
borrowing success than does ethnicity and gender. Table 21 controls for 
sector (and the reference category is agriculture). On the whole, with the 
exception of manufacturing, firms in non-agricultural sectors appear to have 
significantly higher relative risks of being in a disfavoured borrower 
category versus the new/renewed borrowers group relative to firms in the 
agricultural sector. Rather curiously, this includes the indifferent group 
where non-borrowing is attributable to non-need of investment. This 
suggests that relative to other sectors the agricultural sector may not be as 
inert in terms of investment as may be casually perceived, in part because 
agricultural businesses may have a higher diversity of operations, including 
for example, some form of food processing and other complementary 
businesses such as farm shops, than other sectors.  
More importantly, even after controlling for sector, a significant ethnicity 
effect remains for BME Males in terms of rejection, as well as BMEs and 
WBI Females in terms of partial borrowing, debt-avoidance and investment 
indifference. Indeed, given the attention in the literature to the role of 
structure in determining finance outcomes, it is worth considering the 
distribution of gender and ethnicity across industry sectors. In line with 
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other studies that have demonstrated the sectoral distribution of male- and 
female-led firms, within the SME Finance Monitor dataset male-led firms 
are over-represented in manufacturing, wholesale & retail and transport, 
storage & communications, while women-led firms are over-represented in 
hotel & restaurants and health and other social and personal services. 
Again as expected, SMEs jointly led by men and women, often family 
enterprises, are substantially more likely to occur within the agriculture and 
hotel & restaurants sectors. Similarly, it has been well established by prior 
studies that EMBs are typically clustered in a narrow range of fiercely 
competitive market sectors. The SME Finance Monitor dataset also reflects 
this, with an over-representation of the ethnic minority enterprises within 
the hotel & restaurant sector, transport, storage & communications, and 
health and social services.  
Controlling for firm size in Table 22 (reference category: firms with no 
employees), the relative risk of partial borrowing  over new/renewed 
borrowing success among WBI Females relative to WBI males  is no longer 
significant and debt-aversion and non-need is quite low. For BME females, 
investment indifference also abates although partial borrowing and debt-
aversion remains significant. The effect of gender is considerably 
diminished once firm size is controlled for. Overall, the relative risk that 
firms with employees fall in the disfavoured borrowing categories is 
significantly lower relative to merely self-employing enterprises. For BME 
Male enterprises, however, the highly significant relative risk of rejection, 
partial borrowing, debt-aversion and indifference persists.  
A further factor likely to influence borrowing outcomes is having a formal 
written business plan, without which the likelihood of securing bank credit is 
minimal. Given the uncertainty surrounding small ventures, especially in the 
prevailing economic climate, a written business plan may be viewed as 
necessary for effective small business management. However, as business 
plans have become a more conventional and expected part of small 
business management (about half of the sampled firms have one) their 
differential beneficial effect across firms may have diminished, such that 
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only marginal benefits accrue to a business plan per se. Nevertheless, 
controlling for the use of a formal business plan (Table 23) appears to 
lower the effects of ethnicity.   
Table 24 accounts for firm age, the effect of which is to eliminate the 
significant gender effect among WBI Females in the disfavoured groups 
and indeed to suggest that WBI female-led firms may have lower relative 
risks of being declined over finding favour with banks relative to WBI male-
led firms once ethnicity, sector, size, age and the use of a business plan 
DUH DFFRXQWHG IRU ,QFOXGLQJ WKHVH DGGLWLRQDO IDFWRUV UHGXFHV %0( ILUPV¶
funding setbacks further. Moreover, as may be expected, the relative risk 
WKDWVPDOOILUPV¶IDOOLQGLVIDYRXUHGERUURZLQJFDWHJRULHVRYHUQHZUHQHZHG
borrowing successes is lower for older firms relative to new firms under a 
year old.  
The legal status of ownership (Table 24) accounts for further borrower 
variability among small firms, albeit to a lower degree than other variables. 
While accounting for all the previously discussed factors, partnerships, 
limited liability partnerships and limited liability companies appear to be no 
different from sole proprietorships in terms of the relative risk of being 
recently declined or having partial borrowing demands versus being a 
new/renewed borrower. However, sole proprietorships have higher relative 
risks of being debt-averse or indifferent, and are less likely to have existing 
credit facilities compared to limited companies 
Table 25 finds some minor regional differences amongst SMEs in the UK. 
Only Wales and London are significantly different from Scotland. However, 
the relative risk of rejection amongst BME Males compared to WBI Males is 
no longer statistically significant. This suggests that some ethnicity effects 
are captured by minor regional differences. Minor temporal differences 
between the different survey waves in 2012 and 2013 are also detected 
(Table 26).  
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Table 27 accounts for risk and managerial capacity indicators. A poor credit 
record observed as having County Court Judgments (CCJs), Time To Pay 
(TTP) arrangements with HM Revenue and Customs department and 
having had missed loan repayments, bounced cheques and other missed 
payments as self-reported by respondents, is significantly associated with 
rejection. SMEs unable to arrange trade credit are also significantly likely to 
have their credit applications declined. Once these factors are accounted 
for, the residual effect attributable to independent risk ratings per se for the 
relative risk of rejection is not statistically significant. However, more risky 
firms, as graded by rating agencies, are more likely to be partial borrowers 
and debt-averse suggesting a case of efficient self-rationing. Nevertheless, 
a more risky SME is less likely to be indifferent than be successful in 
securing credit than a less risky firm. Risky firms that are investment active 
are still able to secure bank credit. 
In terms of human capital and managerial capacity, firms whose owners 
have vocational qualifications, professional qualifications or a university 
degree appear to have unfulfilled investment needs for which they have not 
sought credit as do firms that indicate they intend to grow significantly in 
the coming year. However, firms with a financial professional in charge of 
business finances are significantly less likely to be rejected, to be partial 
borrowers and to be indifferent. While these human capital and risk factors 
are important, residual ethnicity effects remain with regard to the relative 
risk of partial borrowing, or a debt-aversion and investment indifference as 
compared to borrowing success for BME Males and Females over WBI 
Males. 
Assessments of robustness found that the model was not undermined by 
issues of multi-collinearity. In all the estimations, standard errors were 
clustered using the weighting variable reported in the dataset.  
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Table 17: Factors Determining Small Firm Borrowing (Intercept only) 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 18: The effect of gender on small firm borrowing 
VARIABLES Existing Borrowers 
Newly 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial  
Borrowers 
Potential 
(Debt-
averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent  
(No need) Non-
Borrowers 
      
Female 0.980 0.989 1.191*** 1.366*** 1.351*** 
 (0.041) (0.092) (0.070) (0.063) (0.050) 
Equal partners 0.704*** 0.407*** 0.863 0.769*** 0.670*** 
 (0.057) (0.099) (0.101) (0.073) (0.051) 
      
Observations 44,950 44,950 44,950 44,950 44,950 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 19: The effect of ethnicity on small firm borrowing 
VARIABLES Existing  Borrowers 
Newly 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial  
Borrowers 
Potential 
(Debt-averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent  
(No need) Non-
Borrowers 
      
Minority Ethnic 1.356*** 1.597*** 1.371*** 1.664*** 1.466*** 
 (0.098) (0.287) (0.113) (0.118) (0.094) 
      
Observations 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
VARIABLES Existing 
 Borrowers 
Newly Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial  
Borrowers 
Potential (Debt-
averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent  
(No need) Non-
Borrowers 
      
Constant 1.117*** 0.112*** 0.306*** 0.706*** 1.770*** 
 (0.020) (0.004) (0.008) (0.020) (0.033) 
      
Observations 44,950 44,950 44,950 44,950 44,950 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 20: The effect of gender and ethnicity on small firm borrowing 
VARIABLES Existing Borrowers 
Newly 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial  
Borrowers 
Potential (Debt-
averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent  
(No need) 
Non-Borrowers 
      
Female 0.815*** 0.829 1.240*** 1.446*** 1.292*** 
 (0.052) (0.140) (0.086) (0.080) (0.066) 
Equal Partners 0.617*** 0.335** 0.786* 0.749*** 0.642*** 
 (0.074) (0.152) (0.107) (0.083) (0.070) 
Minority 
ethnic 
1.340*** 1.572** 1.375*** 1.676*** 1.468*** 
 (0.097) (0.283) (0.113) (0.119) (0.095) 
      
Observations 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 20a: The interaction effect of gender and ethnicity on small firm 
borrowing 
      
VARIABLES Existing  Borrowers 
Newly 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial  
Borrowers 
Potential (Debt-
averse) Borrowers 
Indifferent 
(No need) Non-
Borrowers 
WBI Female 0.828*** 0.845 1.208*** 1.427*** 1.306*** 
 (0.054) (0.151) (0.088) (0.083) (0.070) 
WBI Partners 0.628*** 0.299** 0.819 0.763** 0.648*** 
 (0.077) (0.152) (0.112) (0.087) (0.072) 
BME Male 1.374*** 1.591** 1.340*** 1.656*** 1.502*** 
 (0.106) (0.299) (0.122) (0.129) (0.104) 
BME Female 0.970 1.115 2.052*** 2.623*** 1.764*** 
 (0.213) (0.588) (0.424) (0.436) (0.285) 
BME Partners 0.679 0.975 0.563 0.973 0.847 
 (0.281) (1.013) (0.321) (0.357) (0.298) 
      
Observations 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 21: The interaction effect of gender and ethnicity on small firm 
borrowing (controlling for sector) 
VARIABLES Existing Borrowers 
Newly 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial  
Borrowers 
Potential 
(Debt-
averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent  
(No need) 
Non-
Borrowers 
WBI Female 0.807*** 0.844 1.222*** 1.405*** 1.228*** 
 (0.054) (0.153) (0.091) (0.082) (0.067) 
WBI Partners 0.706*** 0.315** 0.841 0.762** 0.680*** 
 (0.086) (0.162) (0.114) (0.085) (0.073) 
BME Male 1.304*** 1.514** 1.295*** 1.610*** 1.442*** 
 (0.101) (0.290) (0.119) (0.125) (0.100) 
BME Female 0.916 1.114 2.098*** 2.592*** 1.611*** 
 (0.203) (0.590) (0.435) (0.433) (0.263) 
BME Partners 0.693 0.971 0.564 0.932 0.808 
 (0.287) (1.021) (0.321) (0.337) (0.284) 
Manufacturing 2.682*** 1.292 1.151 0.743** 1.463*** 
 (0.308) (0.396) (0.148) (0.087) (0.151) 
Wholesale/Retail 2.006*** 2.245*** 1.717*** 1.447*** 1.685*** 
 (0.204) (0.568) (0.184) (0.146) (0.159) 
Hotel/Restaurants 2.142*** 2.987*** 2.265*** 1.869*** 1.898*** 
 (0.256) (0.877) (0.280) (0.214) (0.200) 
Trans/Comms 2.309*** 2.685*** 1.790*** 1.563*** 1.700*** 
 (0.274) (0.785) (0.242) (0.186) (0.184) 
Estates/prof servs 2.322*** 1.891** 1.355** 1.454*** 1.907*** 
 (0.254) (0.534) (0.161) (0.163) (0.196) 
Health/soc servs 2.371*** 1.683* 1.194 1.226** 2.112*** 
 (0.247) (0.476) (0.138) (0.121) (0.202) 
Observations 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 22: The interaction effect of gender and ethnicity on small firm 
borrowing (controlling for sector and size) 
VARIABLES Existing Borrowers 
Newly Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial 
Borrowers 
Potential 
(Debt-
averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent 
(No need) 
Non-
Borrowers 
      
WBI Female 0.869** 0.745 1.063 1.137** 1.113* 
 (0.058) (0.136) (0.079) (0.069) (0.062) 
WBI Partners 0.744** 0.294** 0.751** 0.792** 0.715*** 
 (0.091) (0.151) (0.103) (0.090) (0.077) 
BME Male 1.292*** 1.545** 1.345*** 1.724*** 1.504*** 
 (0.101) (0.297) (0.123) (0.136) (0.105) 
BME Female 0.966 0.993 1.843*** 2.175*** 1.489** 
 (0.217) (0.526) (0.382) (0.367) (0.245) 
BME Partners 0.710 0.968 0.542 0.993 0.857 
 (0.295) (1.022) (0.317) (0.385) (0.310) 
Manufacturing 2.213*** 1.870** 1.680*** 1.372*** 1.977*** 
 (0.250) (0.584) (0.213) (0.153) (0.202) 
Wholesale/Retail 1.812*** 2.625*** 2.025*** 1.749*** 1.846*** 
 (0.180) (0.666) (0.218) (0.166) (0.165) 
Hotel/Restaurants 1.792*** 4.100*** 3.094*** 3.240*** 2.510*** 
 (0.213) (1.218) (0.397) (0.378) (0.260) 
Trans/Comms 2.031*** 3.324*** 2.248*** 2.048*** 1.940*** 
 (0.236) (0.973) (0.305) (0.233) (0.202) 
Estates/prof servs 2.075*** 2.266*** 1.637*** 1.878*** 2.174*** 
 (0.222) (0.638) (0.193) (0.191) (0.211) 
Health/soc servs 1.972*** 2.337*** 1.683*** 2.135*** 2.789*** 
 (0.204) (0.664) (0.199) (0.211) (0.263) 
1- 9 employees 1.205** 0.723* 0.829** 0.381*** 0.459*** 
 (0.106) (0.129) (0.071) (0.028) (0.032) 
10-49 employees 1.734*** 0.383*** 0.471*** 0.126*** 0.298*** 
 (0.150) (0.070) (0.040) (0.010) (0.020) 
50-99 employees 1.958*** 0.244*** 0.234*** 0.082*** 0.274*** 
 (0.195) (0.065) (0.029) (0.008) (0.024) 
100-249  1.834*** 0.201*** 0.189*** 0.054*** 0.232*** 
employees (0.210) (0.077) (0.034) (0.008) (0.023) 
Over 250  1.847*** 0.487 0.120*** 0.054*** 0.218*** 
employees (0.318) (0.213) (0.044) (0.013) (0.038) 
Observations 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 23: The interaction effect of gender and ethnicity on small firm 
borrowing (controlling for sector, size and strategy) 
VARIABLES Existing Borrowers 
Newly 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial 
Borrowers 
Potential 
(Debt-averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent 
(No need) 
Non-
Borrowers 
      
WBI Female 0.869** 0.742 1.061 1.135** 1.114* 
 (0.058) (0.135) (0.079) (0.069) (0.062) 
WBI Partners 0.744** 0.295** 0.754** 0.793** 0.712*** 
 (0.091) (0.152) (0.104) (0.090) (0.077) 
BME Male 1.294*** 1.520** 1.331*** 1.718*** 1.525*** 
 (0.101) (0.293) (0.122) (0.135) (0.107) 
BME Female 0.967 0.979 1.823*** 2.165*** 1.506** 
 (0.217) (0.518) (0.378) (0.366) (0.247) 
BME Partners 0.713 0.933 0.528 0.986 0.884 
 (0.297) (0.982) (0.307) (0.381) (0.321) 
Manufacturing 2.219*** 1.828* 1.654*** 1.367*** 2.017*** 
 (0.251) (0.574) (0.209) (0.153) (0.208) 
Wholesale/Retail 1.814*** 2.613*** 2.017*** 1.749*** 1.855*** 
 (0.180) (0.665) (0.217) (0.165) (0.166) 
Hotel/Restaurants 1.797*** 4.016*** 3.046*** 3.230*** 2.556*** 
 (0.214) (1.195) (0.391) (0.377) (0.266) 
Trans/Comms 2.033*** 3.305*** 2.239*** 2.046*** 1.949*** 
 (0.236) (0.970) (0.303) (0.233) (0.204) 
Estates/prof servs 2.087*** 2.163*** 1.584*** 1.860*** 2.262*** 
 (0.224) (0.617) (0.187) (0.190) (0.221) 
Health/soc servs 1.982*** 2.245*** 1.635*** 2.119*** 2.891*** 
 (0.205) (0.643) (0.194) (0.210) (0.273) 
1- 9 employees 1.210** 0.696** 0.809** 0.378*** 0.473*** 
 (0.107) (0.125) (0.069) (0.028) (0.033) 
10-49 employees 1.750*** 0.352*** 0.445*** 0.124*** 0.319*** 
 (0.152) (0.066) (0.039) (0.010) (0.022) 
50-99 employees 1.985*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.080*** 0.304*** 
 (0.202) (0.060) (0.027) (0.008) (0.027) 
100-249  1.864*** 0.174*** 0.171*** 0.052*** 0.262*** 
employees (0.218) (0.068) (0.031) (0.008) (0.027) 
Over 250  1.880*** 0.419* 0.108*** 0.052*** 0.249*** 
employees (0.328) (0.188) (0.040) (0.013) (0.044) 
Formal Business  0.965 1.354** 1.227*** 1.078* 0.767*** 
Plan (0.045) (0.178) (0.067) (0.049) (0.032) 
Observations 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 24: The interaction effect of gender and ethnicity on small firm 
borrowing (controlling for sector, size, age and strategy) 
 
VARIABLES Existing Borrowers 
Newly 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial  
Borrowers 
Potential 
(Debt-
averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent  
(No need) 
Non-
Borrowers 
WBI Female 0.858** 0.704* 1.030 1.042 1.086 
 (0.057) (0.128) (0.077) (0.064) (0.060) 
WBI Partners 0.763** 0.320** 0.785* 0.882 0.735*** 
 (0.093) (0.165) (0.108) (0.103) (0.080) 
BME Male 1.266*** 1.391* 1.268*** 1.458*** 1.471*** 
 (0.099) (0.269) (0.117) (0.118) (0.104) 
BME Female 0.928 0.828 1.659** 1.619*** 1.397** 
 (0.208) (0.439) (0.348) (0.281) (0.233) 
BME Partners 0.721 0.991 0.547 1.146 0.906 
 (0.299) (1.048) (0.318) (0.424) (0.324) 
Manufacturing 2.170*** 1.662 1.562*** 1.184 1.925*** 
 (0.245) (0.522) (0.197) (0.126) (0.196) 
Wholesale/Retail 1.753*** 2.263*** 1.866*** 1.426*** 1.738*** 
 (0.174) (0.573) (0.201) (0.126) (0.154) 
Hotel/Restaurants 1.697*** 3.125*** 2.642*** 2.277*** 2.268*** 
 (0.201) (0.931) (0.337) (0.256) (0.233) 
Trans/Comms 1.960*** 2.800*** 2.047*** 1.569*** 1.816*** 
 (0.227) (0.812) (0.275) (0.165) (0.188) 
Estates/prof servs 1.996*** 1.833** 1.448*** 1.466*** 2.108*** 
 (0.214) (0.522) (0.172) (0.139) (0.203) 
Health/soc servs 1.902*** 1.882** 1.480*** 1.647*** 2.673*** 
 (0.197) (0.544) (0.175) (0.153) (0.250) 
1- 9 employees 1.251** 0.811 0.898 0.492*** 0.513*** 
 (0.110) (0.147) (0.076) (0.035) (0.036) 
10-49 employees 1.895*** 0.522*** 0.573*** 0.253*** 0.387*** 
 (0.168) (0.106) (0.052) (0.020) (0.028) 
50-99 employees 2.191*** 0.350*** 0.290*** 0.187*** 0.381*** 
 (0.228) (0.103) (0.038) (0.020) (0.035) 
100-249  2.061*** 0.283*** 0.231*** 0.124*** 0.330*** 
employees (0.246) (0.115) (0.043) (0.018) (0.034) 
Over 250  2.099*** 0.703 0.148*** 0.129*** 0.318*** 
employees (0.371) (0.326) (0.055) (0.033) (0.056) 
Formal Business  0.948 1.258* 1.175*** 0.913* 0.744*** 
Plan (0.044) (0.167) (0.065) (0.042) (0.031) 
Age: 1 ± 2 yrs 1.151 0.290*** 0.584** 0.380*** 0.565*** 
 (0.324) (0.111) (0.141) (0.077) (0.123) 
Age: 2 ± 5 yrs 1.165 0.283*** 0.403*** 0.202*** 0.587*** 
 (0.301) (0.087) (0.085) (0.036) (0.112) 
Age: 6 ± 9 yrs 1.070 0.239*** 0.365*** 0.098*** 0.462*** 
 (0.275) (0.073) (0.077) (0.018) (0.088) 
Age: 10 ± 15 yrs 1.056 0.182*** 0.277*** 0.076*** 0.379*** 
 (0.268) (0.058) (0.058) (0.013) (0.071) 
Age: Over 15 yrs 0.918 0.126*** 0.260*** 0.059*** 0.365*** 
 (0.232) (0.038) (0.054) (0.010) (0.068) 
Observations 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 
Pseudo R-squared 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
The financing of diverse enterprises 
 
 42 
Table 25: The interaction effect of gender and ethnicity on small firm 
borrowing (controlling for sector, size, age, strategy, ownership status, 
and UK Region) 
VARIABLES Existing Borrowers 
Newly 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial 
Borrowers 
Potential 
(Debt-averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent  
(No need) Non-
Borrowers 
WBI Female 0.899 0.713* 1.026 1.032 1.103* 
 (0.060) (0.129) (0.077) (0.064) (0.062) 
WBI Partners 1.227 0.441 0.831 1.173 1.077 
 (0.164) (0.249) (0.130) (0.154) (0.128) 
BME Male 1.179** 1.347 1.251** 1.391*** 1.430*** 
 (0.093) (0.265) (0.116) (0.114) (0.101) 
BME Female 0.856 0.774 1.626** 1.500** 1.342* 
 (0.193) (0.409) (0.342) (0.265) (0.226) 
BME Partners 1.156 1.371 0.573 1.536 1.350 
 (0.487) (1.479) (0.337) (0.575) (0.490) 
Manufacturing 1.857*** 1.567 1.586*** 1.183 1.777*** 
 (0.210) (0.492) (0.201) (0.127) (0.178) 
Wholesale/Retail 1.531*** 2.143*** 1.873*** 1.404*** 1.627*** 
 (0.152) (0.545) (0.203) (0.124) (0.140) 
Hotel/Restaurants 1.599*** 2.982*** 2.593*** 2.207*** 2.187*** 
 (0.189) (0.898) (0.329) (0.246) (0.218) 
Trans/Comms 1.719*** 2.608*** 2.040*** 1.511*** 1.681*** 
 (0.197) (0.759) (0.274) (0.158) (0.169) 
Estates/prof servs 1.699*** 1.731* 1.460*** 1.468*** 1.986*** 
 (0.181) (0.500) (0.177) (0.140) (0.187) 
Health/soc servs 1.698*** 1.792** 1.475*** 1.612*** 2.528*** 
 (0.175) (0.518) (0.175) (0.150) (0.231) 
1- 9 employees 1.026 0.880 0.993 0.615*** 0.557*** 
 (0.102) (0.178) (0.097) (0.050) (0.044) 
10-49 employees 1.362*** 0.562** 0.659*** 0.344*** 0.416*** 
 (0.148) (0.136) (0.074) (0.033) (0.037) 
50-99 employees 1.526*** 0.373*** 0.336*** 0.257*** 0.404*** 
 (0.187) (0.120) (0.049) (0.031) (0.042) 
100-249  1.418** 0.299*** 0.266*** 0.169*** 0.347*** 
employees (0.194) (0.127) (0.052) (0.027) (0.041) 
Over 250  1.442* 0.747 0.171*** 0.176*** 0.334*** 
employees (0.271) (0.354) (0.064) (0.046) (0.062) 
Formal Business  0.922* 1.255* 1.192*** 0.936 0.743*** 
Plan (0.043) (0.170) (0.066) (0.044) (0.031) 
Age: 1 ± 2 yrs 1.134 0.287*** 0.584** 0.377*** 0.560*** 
 (0.320) (0.109) (0.142) (0.076) (0.122) 
Age: 2 ± 5 yrs 1.141 0.279*** 0.402*** 0.198*** 0.575*** 
 (0.295) (0.085) (0.085) (0.035) (0.110) 
Age: 6 ± 9 yrs 1.030 0.233*** 0.363*** 0.096*** 0.451*** 
 (0.266) (0.072) (0.077) (0.017) (0.086) 
Age: 10 ± 15 yrs 1.013 0.178*** 0.276*** 0.075*** 0.370*** 
 (0.258) (0.056) (0.058) (0.013) (0.070) 
Age: Over 15 yrs 0.915 0.126*** 0.262*** 0.058*** 0.366*** 
 (0.232) (0.038) (0.054) (0.010) (0.068) 
Partnership  0.858 0.639 0.818* 0.562*** 0.615*** 
 (0.096) (0.178) (0.094) (0.054) (0.056) 
Ltd partnership  1.038 0.699 0.798 0.460*** 0.593*** 
 (0.149) (0.276) (0.127) (0.065) (0.075) 
Ltd company   1.673*** 0.946 0.831** 0.688*** 0.959 
 (0.137) (0.168) (0.073) (0.048) (0.063) 
North East 1.155 1.662 0.995 1.335** 1.261* 
 (0.155) (0.537) (0.151) (0.171) (0.152) 
Yorks/Humber 1.118 0.772 0.959 0.992 1.135 
 (0.124) (0.245) (0.120) (0.110) (0.107) 
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(Table 25 continued) 
 
 
 
North West 
 
 
 
 
1.041 
 
 
 
 
1.054 
 
 
 
 
1.094 
 
 
 
 
1.058 
 
 
 
 
1.188* 
 (0.116) (0.307) (0.137) (0.119) (0.116) 
West Mids 1.027 1.105 0.892 0.934 1.067 
 (0.109) (0.316) (0.112) (0.096) (0.098) 
East Mids 1.161 1.271 1.098 1.175 1.249** 
 (0.132) (0.408) (0.155) (0.140) (0.141) 
East Anglia 1.049 1.064 0.988 1.061 1.184* 
 (0.123) (0.330) (0.123) (0.114) (0.116) 
Wales 1.067 1.335 1.303** 1.277** 1.171 
 (0.128) (0.427) (0.170) (0.152) (0.125) 
South West 0.939 1.020 1.158 1.034 1.077 
 (0.112) (0.297) (0.139) (0.107) (0.109) 
London 1.426*** 1.267 1.156 1.329*** 1.245** 
 (0.149) (0.353) (0.136) (0.134) (0.123) 
South East 1.113 1.031 1.006 1.075 1.112 
 (0.115) (0.285) (0.124) (0.105) (0.105) 
Northern Ireland 0.800* 0.805 0.945 0.837 0.822* 
 (0.102) (0.278) (0.139) (0.104) (0.088) 
Observations 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 
Pseudo R-squared 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 26: The interaction effect of gender and ethnicity on small firm 
borrowing (controlling for sector, size, age, strategy, ownership status, 
UK Region and Period (wave)) 
VARIABLES Existing Borrowers 
Newly 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial 
Borrowers 
Potential 
(Debt-averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent 
(No need) Non-
Borrowers 
WBI Female 0.902 0.714* 1.023 1.037 1.107* 
 (0.060) (0.130) (0.077) (0.065) (0.062) 
WBI Partners 1.246 0.444 0.828 1.187 1.091 
 (0.168) (0.250) (0.130) (0.156) (0.130) 
BME Male 1.185** 1.357 1.248** 1.403*** 1.442*** 
 (0.094) (0.266) (0.116) (0.115) (0.102) 
BME Female 0.868 0.780 1.641** 1.515** 1.364* 
 (0.195) (0.413) (0.345) (0.269) (0.232) 
BME Partners 1.197 1.417 0.564 1.605 1.407 
 (0.508) (1.526) (0.331) (0.604) (0.511) 
Manufacturing 1.856*** 1.572 1.582*** 1.187 1.779*** 
 (0.209) (0.491) (0.202) (0.125) (0.172) 
Wholesale/Retail 1.531*** 2.146*** 1.870*** 1.407*** 1.629*** 
 (0.153) (0.543) (0.203) (0.121) (0.135) 
Hotel/Restaurants 1.602*** 2.987*** 2.589*** 2.212*** 2.192*** 
 (0.190) (0.896) (0.328) (0.243) (0.213) 
Trans/Comms 1.721*** 2.616*** 2.042*** 1.515*** 1.688*** 
 (0.201) (0.759) (0.274) (0.157) (0.168) 
Estates/prof servs 1.707*** 1.741* 1.458*** 1.475*** 1.996*** 
 (0.182) (0.500) (0.176) (0.138) (0.183) 
Health/soc servs 1.701*** 1.798** 1.472*** 1.617*** 2.536*** 
 (0.177) (0.517) (0.175) (0.148) (0.224) 
1- 9 employees 1.021 0.878 0.995 0.611*** 0.552*** 
 (0.101) (0.178) (0.098) (0.049) (0.043) 
10-49 employees 1.353*** 0.562** 0.661*** 0.341*** 0.412*** 
 (0.147) (0.136) (0.075) (0.032) (0.036) 
50-99 employees 1.510*** 0.371*** 0.337*** 0.253*** 0.398*** 
 (0.184) (0.120) (0.050) (0.030) (0.041) 
100-249  1.427*** 0.302*** 0.266*** 0.169*** 0.348*** 
employees (0.195) (0.128) (0.053) (0.027) (0.042) 
Over 250  1.442* 0.759 0.170*** 0.178*** 0.336*** 
employees (0.273) (0.360) (0.064) (0.047) (0.063) 
Formal Business  0.925* 1.254* 1.190*** 0.938 0.743*** 
Plan (0.043) (0.169) (0.066) (0.044) (0.031) 
Age: 1 ± 2 yrs 1.154 0.289*** 0.583** 0.381*** 0.566*** 
 (0.326) (0.110) (0.141) (0.077) (0.124) 
Age: 2 ± 5 yrs 1.137 0.279*** 0.403*** 0.198*** 0.575*** 
 (0.294) (0.085) (0.085) (0.035) (0.111) 
Age: 6 ± 9 yrs 1.038 0.234*** 0.362*** 0.097*** 0.454*** 
 (0.267) (0.072) (0.077) (0.017) (0.087) 
Age: 10 ± 15 yrs 1.012 0.177*** 0.277*** 0.075*** 0.369*** 
 (0.258) (0.056) (0.058) (0.013) (0.070) 
Age: Over 15 yrs 0.921 0.126*** 0.262*** 0.058*** 0.367*** 
 (0.233) (0.038) (0.054) (0.010) (0.069) 
Partnership  0.853 0.637 0.817* 0.564*** 0.617*** 
 (0.095) (0.178) (0.094) (0.054) (0.056) 
Ltd partnership  1.025 0.687 0.804 0.455*** 0.590*** 
 (0.148) (0.271) (0.128) (0.064) (0.075) 
Ltd company   1.671*** 0.941 0.829** 0.689*** 0.962 
 (0.137) (0.167) (0.073) (0.048) (0.064) 
North East 1.157 1.661 0.995 1.338** 1.262** 
 (0.155) (0.539) (0.151) (0.169) (0.150) 
Yorks/Humber 1.119 0.775 0.959 0.994 1.136 
 (0.122) (0.246) (0.120) (0.105) (0.102) 
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(Table 26 continued) 
 
 
North West 
 
 
1.044 
 
 
 
1.056 
 
 
 
1.094 
 
 
 
1.060 
 
 
 
1.190* 
 (0.114) (0.306) (0.137) (0.116) (0.112) 
West Mids 1.027 1.107 0.892 0.935 1.068 
 (0.107) (0.317) (0.111) (0.094) (0.096) 
East Mids 1.163 1.273 1.100 1.177 1.249** 
 (0.133) (0.410) (0.157) (0.136) (0.135) 
East Anglia 1.049 1.064 0.986 1.061 1.183* 
 (0.122) (0.330) (0.123) (0.111) (0.113) 
Wales 1.063 1.333 1.297** 1.275** 1.167 
 (0.127) (0.426) (0.169) (0.151) (0.123) 
South West 0.939 1.021 1.159 1.035 1.076 
 (0.111) (0.298) (0.139) (0.104) (0.106) 
London 1.424*** 1.268 1.155 1.328*** 1.244** 
 (0.149) (0.353) (0.135) (0.132) (0.121) 
South East 1.118 1.036 1.007 1.080 1.116 
 (0.114) (0.288) (0.124) (0.105) (0.105) 
Northern Ireland 0.795* 0.801 0.940 0.836 0.817* 
 (0.101) (0.277) (0.138) (0.103) (0.085) 
wave5 0.599*** 0.772 1.225** 0.631*** 0.622*** 
 (0.043) (0.145) (0.102) (0.045) (0.043) 
wave6 0.618*** 0.804 1.145* 0.770*** 0.753*** 
 (0.046) (0.151) (0.093) (0.056) (0.050) 
wave7 0.747*** 0.824 1.060 0.909 0.922 
 (0.053) (0.157) (0.091) (0.066) (0.061) 
wave8 0.754*** 1.031 1.063 1.014 0.944 
 (0.055) (0.203) (0.094) (0.073) (0.063) 
Observations 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 
Pseudo R-squared 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 27: The interaction effect of gender and ethnicity on small firm 
borrowing: controlling for sector, size, age, strategy, ownership 
status, UK Region, period (wave), risk, management and future plans) 
VARIABLES Existing Borrowers 
Newly 
Declined 
Borrowers 
Partial 
Borrowers 
Potential 
(Debt-averse) 
Borrowers 
Indifferent 
(No need) Non-
Borrowers 
WBI Female 0.905 0.722* 1.049 1.046 1.102* 
 (0.061) (0.132) (0.080) (0.066) (0.062) 
WBI Partners 1.232 0.454 0.853 1.188 1.069 
 (0.167) (0.257) (0.138) (0.159) (0.129) 
BME Male 1.168* 1.349 1.242** 1.382*** 1.440*** 
 (0.093) (0.269) (0.119) (0.114) (0.103) 
BME Female 0.861 0.786 1.649** 1.511** 1.389* 
 (0.193) (0.417) (0.352) (0.268) (0.237) 
BME Partners 1.145 1.393 0.534 1.513 1.387 
 (0.492) (1.525) (0.325) (0.573) (0.496) 
Manufacturing 2.023*** 1.529 1.346** 1.101 1.971*** 
 (0.233) (0.483) (0.180) (0.117) (0.196) 
Wholesale/Retail 1.707*** 2.011*** 1.514*** 1.310*** 1.828*** 
 (0.175) (0.522) (0.175) (0.114) (0.156) 
Hotel/Restaurants 1.780*** 2.918*** 2.166*** 2.116*** 2.427*** 
 (0.217) (0.881) (0.289) (0.236) (0.246) 
Trans/Comms 1.856*** 2.580*** 1.819*** 1.447*** 1.833*** 
 (0.222) (0.762) (0.257) (0.150) (0.188) 
Estates/prof servs 1.771*** 1.780** 1.381** 1.412*** 2.134*** 
 (0.194) (0.515) (0.176) (0.133) (0.200) 
Health/soc servs 1.779*** 1.845** 1.423*** 1.592*** 2.686*** 
 (0.188) (0.536) (0.177) (0.146) (0.241) 
1- 9 employees 1.038 0.854 0.921 0.615*** 0.574*** 
 (0.103) (0.170) (0.091) (0.050) (0.046) 
10-49 employees 1.297** 0.599** 0.672*** 0.368*** 0.413*** 
 (0.142) (0.144) (0.076) (0.035) (0.037) 
50-99 employees 1.405*** 0.416*** 0.363*** 0.275*** 0.394*** 
 (0.174) (0.136) (0.054) (0.033) (0.042) 
100-249  1.325** 0.352** 0.291*** 0.188*** 0.349*** 
employees (0.182) (0.154) (0.060) (0.030) (0.043) 
Over 250  1.325 0.932 0.205*** 0.197*** 0.334*** 
employees (0.255) (0.451) (0.077) (0.052) (0.063) 
Formal Business  0.927 1.278* 1.176*** 0.935 0.772*** 
Plan (0.044) (0.175) (0.068) (0.045) (0.033) 
Age: 1 ± 2 yrs 1.177 0.289*** 0.571** 0.387*** 0.579** 
 (0.334) (0.110) (0.139) (0.078) (0.127) 
Age: 2 ± 5 yrs 1.126 0.282*** 0.415*** 0.210*** 0.584*** 
 (0.294) (0.086) (0.089) (0.038) (0.113) 
Age: 6 ± 9 yrs 0.999 0.258*** 0.408*** 0.109*** 0.449*** 
 (0.260) (0.081) (0.088) (0.020) (0.087) 
Age: 10 ± 15 yrs 0.933 0.203*** 0.329*** 0.087*** 0.354*** 
 (0.241) (0.066) (0.070) (0.016) (0.068) 
Age: Over 15 yrs 0.814 0.150*** 0.347*** 0.070*** 0.333*** 
 (0.209) (0.047) (0.073) (0.012) (0.063) 
Partnership  0.825* 0.652 0.864 0.571*** 0.605*** 
 (0.093) (0.183) (0.101) (0.055) (0.056) 
Ltd partnership  0.967 0.706 0.872 0.467*** 0.581*** 
 (0.141) (0.281) (0.144) (0.067) (0.074) 
Ltd company   1.576*** 0.982 0.876 0.700*** 0.943 
 (0.132) (0.174) (0.077) (0.050) (0.064) 
North East 1.166 1.593 0.953 1.336** 1.297** 
 (0.157) (0.519) (0.147) (0.169) (0.154) 
Yorks/Humber 1.135 0.741 0.899 0.981 1.170* 
 (0.124) (0.236) (0.115) (0.104) (0.106) 
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(Table 27 
continued) 
 
North West 
 
 
1.067 
 
 
1.028 
 
 
1.042 
 
 
1.049 
 
 
1.234** 
 (0.117) (0.300) (0.132) (0.115) (0.117) 
West Mids 1.044 1.070 0.841 0.922 1.103 
 (0.109) (0.307) (0.107) (0.093) (0.100) 
East Mids 1.193 1.246 1.036 1.172 1.295** 
 (0.136) (0.404) (0.153) (0.137) (0.142) 
East Anglia 1.053 1.053 0.971 1.059 1.204* 
 (0.124) (0.326) (0.122) (0.113) (0.118) 
Wales 1.090 1.270 1.212 1.266** 1.207* 
 (0.130) (0.410) (0.161) (0.151) (0.127) 
South West 0.962 0.991 1.097 1.026 1.118 
 (0.115) (0.290) (0.136) (0.104) (0.111) 
London 1.428*** 1.258 1.143 1.315*** 1.283** 
 (0.150) (0.352) (0.138) (0.131) (0.124) 
South East 1.127 1.004 0.970 1.063 1.143 
 (0.115) (0.280) (0.121) (0.103) (0.108) 
Northern Ireland 0.779* 0.778 0.915 0.836 0.833* 
 (0.102) (0.271) (0.136) (0.103) (0.089) 
wave5 0.532*** 0.821 1.407*** 0.685*** 0.536*** 
 (0.044) (0.181) (0.146) (0.058) (0.042) 
wave6 0.547*** 0.881 1.349*** 0.828** 0.648*** 
 (0.046) (0.193) (0.134) (0.070) (0.049) 
wave7 0.747*** 0.846 1.095 0.915 0.915 
 (0.053) (0.162) (0.096) (0.066) (0.061) 
wave8 0.754*** 1.060 1.095 1.030 0.938 
 (0.056) (0.209) (0.099) (0.075) (0.063) 
Vocational Quals 0.725*** 1.049 1.244** 1.085 0.734*** 
 (0.058) (0.221) (0.127) (0.085) (0.053) 
Professional Qual 0.832** 1.063 1.268** 1.052 0.811*** 
 (0.067) (0.252) (0.141) (0.091) (0.060) 
Degree Qual 0.847** 1.306 1.389*** 1.157* 0.792*** 
 (0.062) (0.280) (0.143) (0.097) (0.057) 
Finance prof 1.047 0.718** 0.807*** 0.952 0.880*** 
 (0.050) (0.096) (0.048) (0.047) (0.038) 
Next year plan:  0.835** 0.916 1.215** 1.070 0.666*** 
Substantial growth (0.067) (0.200) (0.113) (0.084) (0.050) 
Bad credit history 0.554*** 1.841*** 2.556*** 0.875** 0.388*** 
(ccj,ttp,miss pyts) (0.037) (0.241) (0.159) (0.052) (0.024) 
No trade credit 0.802 2.762*** 3.874*** 2.446*** 0.508*** 
 (0.128) (0.646) (0.489) (0.327) (0.082) 
Risk: Low 0.796*** 0.949 1.450*** 1.108 0.671*** 
 (0.050) (0.211) (0.157) (0.093) (0.042) 
Risk: Average 0.675*** 0.841 1.886*** 1.227*** 0.629*** 
 (0.043) (0.187) (0.199) (0.095) (0.039) 
Risk: Above avg 0.699*** 1.351 2.360*** 1.573*** 0.671*** 
 (0.053) (0.305) (0.260) (0.136) (0.048) 
Risk: Unknown 0.735*** 1.248 1.793*** 1.502*** 0.709*** 
 (0.076) (0.344) (0.247) (0.157) (0.065) 
Observations 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 24,933 
Pseudo R-squared 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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9. Conclusions 
This analysis contributes to our understanding of the finance issues 
currently facing diverse SMEs by presenting a new analysis of the SME 
Finance Monitor. Central to this analysis is the development of a new 
typology of borrowers that captures the SME population across three 
groups based on finance demand: Patent Demand, Partial Demand and 
Latent Demand. This permits categorisation of SMEs into six analytical 
groups: existing borrowers; new/renewed borrowers; declined borrowers 
(Patent Demand); Partial borrowers (Partial Demand); potential borrowers; 
and indifferent non-borrowers (Latent Demand). Using this typology as the 
analytical lens enabled a more granular view of the SME Finance Monitor 
dataset and a more detailed analyses of types of discouragement than has 
been previously presented.  
With regard to debt avoidance, the analysis reveals both a broader set of 
discouraged borrowers and a wider set of antecedents of discouragement 
than have previously been identified. For reasons of caution, partial 
borrowers were not included within the potential borrower group but were 
treated as their own analytical category. Within the Latent Demand group, 
the typology distinguished between SMEs that are discouraged and those 
that are disinterested. Among discouraged SMEs, relatively few were found 
to be directly discouraged by banks either dissuading them against 
application or through disillusionment having been rejected in the past. A 
much larger proportion was found to be indirectly discouraged by non-bank 
factors including media reports or hearsay, self-diagnosed likelihood of 
rejection, unsuitable products on offer, or daunted by a priori notions of 
what bank borrowing entailed. Given the greater impact of indirect, rather 
than direct, discouragement, there is a need for further consideration of an 
appropriate policy response to tackle the effects of indirect 
discouragement.  
While a strong gender and ethnic minority effect was observed with regard 
to overall debt-aversion, it is not possible to state whether diverse 
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enterprises are more prone to particular types of discouragement or more 
influenced by specific antecedents. Even with such a remarkably large 
dataset as is provided by the SME Finance Monitor, the cell sizes for 
discouragement and diversity are too small to provide meaningful 
conclusions. 
It is, however, possible to comment on the broader finance outcomes of 
diverse enterprises. While bivariate analysis revealed significant and 
notable gender and ethnic effects in finance outcomes, for White British 
and Irish women-owned firms these effects were mainly dissipated when 
other factors, such as legal form and firm age, were considered. 
Multivariate analysis of ethnicity suggests a different experience. While 
structural factors such as sector, firm size, the presence of a business plan, 
firm age, and legal form all impact on finance outcomes, even after 
controlling for these structural factors, the relative risk of partial borrowing, 
debt avoidance even when in need of finance, and  investment indifference 
(non-need) over borrowing success remains higher among Black and 
Minority Ethnic enterprises.  
Interestingly, this analysis shows that employment by a business of 
professional financial services reduces the risk of these outcomes. This 
suggests that greater attention needs to be given to the education, training 
and advice provided to diverse enterprises to ensure that they are able to 
build the strongest possible business case and to manage their businesses 
finances more professionally to enhance their likelihood of pursuing and 
securing finance. An important element is ensuring that firm-level 
informational opacity is minimised and that risk ratings are known in 
advance. Even then, however, diverse SMEs should endeavour to avoid 
obvious risk factors, such as CCJs and missed payments, and should also 
pursue other non-bank credit arrangements such as trade credit. This is 
particularly apparent for ethnic minority owned businesses, but also for 
women-owned enterprises. As this analysis has shown, diverse enterprises 
typically have lower levels of external investment, a factor that prior studies 
have associated with longer term under-performance. While this analysis 
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focused only on finance outcomes rather than performance outcomes, it is 
likely that the relative under-funding seen in this study in the lower average 
levels of finance volume requested and received will lead to poorer longer 
term performance of these firms.  
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APPENDIX 1: OPERATIONALISING THE TYPOLOGY 
OF BORROWERS USING SMEFM DATASET 
Empirical observation of the borrower categories largely followed the 
filtered responses within the SME Finance Monitor questionnaire. The first 
FDWHJRU\ ³3DWHQW GHPDQG´ FDSWXUHV UHVSRQGHQWV ZKR HLWKHU KDYH DQ
existing credit facility or have had a new application event over the last 12 
months. Q15 captures the forms of external finance the business currently 
uses (existing facilities) and Q26 (and subsequent filtering) addresses new 
applications and their outcomes, including acceptance (whether outright or 
after issues) and whether it was the business or the bank that declined the 
offer or application. Businesses that neither had a successful or a declined 
application in the preceding 12 months but still had a facility were 
categorised as existing borrowers. The small number of applications that 
were reported to be pending was not considered in the categorisation.  
Finances taken out in the personal name of the business owner were 
excluded in the above category since interest was in the businesses 
themselves. Such finances were therefore taken to be equivalent to 
finances supplied by the owner to the business (i.e. non-bank sources) and 
KHQFH FRXQWHG DV ³ODWHQW GHPDQG´ IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI WKH EXVLQHVV
These elements were observed in Q15bbb, Q26e, Q51a, Q52 and Q148a. 
The latent demand group included all firms in the sample whose responses 
had not placed them within the existing, new/renewed and declined 
borrowers. Subsequently, firms were categorised as debt-averse potential 
borrowers if the business needed external financing but had not made a 
formal application or indifferent non-borrowers where there was no 
indication of present need for finance.  
Potential borrowers were captured where the business owner had put in 
their own money in the business (Q15d_d2), taken out credit in their own 
personal names (Q15bbb, Q26e) including converting business facilities to 
personal loans (Q26-27-28), or indicated that they needed finance even 
though they had not applied (Q115, Q209). Subsequently, discouragement 
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was observed wKHUH WKH EXVLQHVV RZQHU ³IHOW´ WKH\ KDG WR SXW SHUVRQDO
PRQH\ LQ UDWKHU WKDQ ³FKRVH´ 4GBG DQG PRUH LPSRUWDQWO\ LQ
accordance with responses to Q115 and Q209. What was given as the 
main reason was then used to identify the form of discouragement in Layer 
5 and, in turn in Layer 4, where direct discouragement included a situation 
where the bank dissuaded a formal application following an informal 
inquiry, or a previous rejection resulted in present discouragement. 
Disinterested borrowers were observed as those businesses that indicated 
that they needed finance but had not applied (potential borrowers) but were 
not captured within the discouraged group. This was comprised firms that 
had indicated a preference for non-bank financing, choosing to use 
personal finances or finances from family and friends.  
The indifferent non-borrowers (no present need) group comprises a 
residual group of firms that did not have a credit facility, had not made an 
application and had not indicated that they needed finance. Businesses 
within this residual category that had had a facility in the past (q14q15x, 
q27) were categorised as defunct. Businesses that had never applied for 
external finance were categorised as listless non-borrowers.  
In establishing mutual exclusivity between the groups, it was found that 
certain firms had been captured as potential borrowers with respect to one 
facility (e.g. loan) but either had another facility (e.g. overdraft) in place or 
applied for. This led to the creation of a category of partial borrowers, i.e. 
firms that were existing customers or recent applicants for a given facility 
(patent demand), which also demonstrated latent demand 
(discouragement) with respect to other financial products. 
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